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Chapter 1
Introduction:
Redistribution in a Divided World*
1 Globalization and Inequality
The world is becoming more integrated economically, but despite this pro-
cess of globalization the world remains divided in many respects. The world
is thus both integrated and divided, at the same time, but along different
dimensions. Economic integration has made countries more interdependent
and this interdependence makes the remaining divisions more acute. In par-
ticular, interdependence has reduced countries ability to redistribute income
between groups in society. The starting point of this dissertation is a situ-
ation in which political, economic and social communities do not coincide;
a world with a more or less global economy, divided into sovereign politi-
cal states encompassing diverse social communities. The five essays study
different aspects of redistributive policy in such a world.
Economic integration is a result of two sets of causes. First, technologi-
cal and social changes have reduced the effective economic distance between
countries. This have made the world markedly smaller and included a larger
part of the world in the global economy. In particular improvements in trans-
portation and communications technology have made it easier and cheaper
to move goods, services and factors of production between countries and con-
tinents (Tanzi 1995). The development of modern information technology is
the last, but an important, part of this process of integration. The second
·1 would like to thank Agnar Sandmo and Iver Ørstavik for valuable comments. Fi-
nancial support from the Norwegian Research Council (the Ethics-program) is gratefully
acknowledged.
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set of causes is political reforms aimed at lowering barriers to trade. The last
decades have witnessed a rapid reduction, and often elimination, of tariffs
on traded goods and services. There has also been a reduction in non-tariff
barriers to trade, i.e. various technical, bureaucratic and legal hindrances to
trade. Social changes, in particular the dominance of 'western culture', have
also facilitated trade.
As a result of these developments, the past 50 years have seen an ex-
ceptional growth in world trade and a steady increase in world exports as a
share of GDP. Merchandise exports have grown on average by 6% annually
and total trade in 1997 was 14-times the level of 1950. The increase in inter-
national trade has contributed to the economic growth and prosperity which
large parts of the world has experienced after World War II. However, eco-
nomic integration has also created international spillovers, in the sense that
activities and policies in one country affect other countries. These spillovers
make it more difficult for governments to control events within their own
countries. Partly as a response to the increased economic interdependence
and the resulting reduction in national autonomy, there have been some de-
velopments in direction of international political integration. Two trends are
particularly important. First, there has been a sharp growth in membership
in international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The membership in the UN has, for example, increased from the original 51
in 1945 to 188 today, and the membership in the IMF has grown from 39
members when it was established in 1946 to 182 members today. Second,
deeper regional integration has taken place in many parts of the world. This
process has gone farthest in Europe through the establishment of the EU and
the EEA.
Despite these important developments towards integration the world re-
mains, and in some respects has become more, divided both economically,
politically and socially. Even if trade in goods, services and capital have been
liberalized, labour markets are still highly segregated. The opportunity to
migrate to another country is limited for large parts of the worlds population,
especially for those who might have the best reasons to do so. Furthermore,
the worlds resources and wealth are highly unevenly distributed and the divi-
sion between rich and poor countries is a striking feature of the world order.
Citizenship in rich countries are perhaps more important today than ever
before. The process of international political integration has been slower and
more limited than the process of economic integration. Despite its reported
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death, the nation-state is still the main pillar of the political and legal world
order and the political jurisdictions are therefore smaller than economic ar-
eas. The world is also divided socially and culturally. Social communities are
typically smaller than both economic areas and political jurisdictions. One
important reason for this is that peoples abilities to form personal bonds and
attachments to other people are limited.
Globalization is not a new phenomenon. By some measures the world
economy was equally integrated before World War I and the return to pro-
tectionist policies during the interwar period. The second wave of globaliza-
tion has, however, changed in important ways. First, it is primarily capital,
not labour that has experienced increased international mobility. This has
created an asymmetry between highly mobile capital and relatively immobile
labour that did not characterize the first wave of globalization (Rodrik 1997).
Furthermore, the composition of international trade has changed. In partic-
ular trade in similar products, so-called intraindustri trade, has increased as
a share of total trade. This development has exposed a larger share of the
economy to international competition. Finally, the welfare state, with a large
public sector and generous social security systems, has developed after World
War II. The need for government revenues has therefore increased dramat-
ically compared with the last peak of globalization. Higher tax levels have
made differences in tax policy more important for countries competitiveness
and increased the problem of tax competition between countries.
There is evidence that there has been an increase in the inequality of dis-
posable income in the OECD countries during the last two decades (Gottschalk
and Smeeding 1997) and globalization has been claimed to be an impor-
tant cause of this development. Globalization could increase income inequal-
ity partly through its effect on the pre-tax income distribution and partly
through its effect on the cost of redistribution. Economic theory suggests
that globalization might increase pre-tax inequality for two reasons. First,
we would expect that trade between countries well endowed with skilled
labour and countries well endowed with unskilled labour would reduce the
wage of unskilled labour in the first type of countries. However, the fact that
the major part of international trade takes place between rich industrialized
countries implies that the importance of this effect is limited (Krugman 1997).
Second, and perhaps more importantly, increased international mobility of
capital increases the elasticity of demand for labour in each country and thus
reduces the bargaining power of workers. The result might be a downwards
pressure on their wage. Globalization does not only increase pre-tax inequal-
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ity, but it could also reduce the governments ability to redistribute income.
Economic integration and increased mobility of persons, goods and factors
of production make the task of redistributing income between groups within
the nationstate increasingly difficult because internationally mobile tax bases
can escape taxation by moving to another jurisdiction (see e.g. Christiansen,
Hagen and Sandmo 1994 and Sinn 1990).
Below we give a brief presentation of the five papers in the dissertation
and their main results. The presentation is organized around three themes
that have motivated the dissertation. The next section shows how the papers
might shed some light on the relationships between national and international
justice. Section 3 relates the papers to the problems that arise when an inte-
grated economic area consists of more than one jurisdiction, while section 4
discusses how the dissertation might contribute to a better understanding of
the importance of social attachments and altruistic motivation in redistribu-
tive policy. Section 5 concludes with some general remarks.
2 National and international justice
The relationship between national and international income distribution has
a central position in the dissertation. Theories of distributive justice have
mainly been concerned with closed economies. Their focus have been on
the choice of distributive principles; i.e. what should be distributed and
how should it be distributed? Economic interaction between countries raises
some fundamental ethical questions not often addressed in this literature,
such as; i) Between whom should we distribute? In particular, why should
redistribution primarily take place within the nationstate? ii) What gives a
public entity the right to tax a certain tax base? In particular, what gives
a state the right to tax an international tax base and how should such tax
rights be distributed between states? iii) What is the relationship between
national and international distributive justice? In particular, how do we
resolve conflicts between national distribution and international distribution?
iv) What is the relationship between the liberal right to free movement and
distributive justice? In particular, can considerations of distributive justice
justify limitations in the free movement of labour, goods or capital?
The papers in this dissertation will hopefully shed some light on several
of these questions. However, the focus is on the question of how the right
to tax should be distributed between jurisdictions. The ability, and right,
5
to levy taxes is a fundamental feature of a sovereign state. Without the
power to appropriate economic resources a state would be unable to redis-
tribute resources among its citizens and to provide public goods. Interna-
tional transactions give rise to situations where more than one country have
the ability to tax the same tax base. It is therefore important to determine
how the right to tax should be distributed between countries. How this is
done affects countries ability to redistribute resources nationally as well as
the international distribution of tax revenues.
The dissertation distinguishes between two fundamentally different ways
of approaching the question of tax right distribution. According to what we
call the entitlement approach, certain connecting factors between a tax base
and a country gives the country an entitlement, or a non-derivative right,
to appropriate these economic resources. Somewhat simplified one could say
that the entitlement approach sees a country's right to tax, and the corre-
sponding tax liability of a tax subject, as deriving from special duties that
we have to persons or groups that we have a particular relationship to. The
alternative approach is what we call the assignment approach. Within this
approach international tax principles are viewed as pragmatic rules derived
from general moral considerations. The just principles of taxation are those
that distribute, or assign, tax rights in such a way as to maximise some gen-
eral objective. The assignment approach thus rejects the notion of special
duties and views the just distribution of tax rights simply as the best way to
implement the general duties we have towards everyone as human beings.
The first paper in this dissertation, "Moral Theory and International Fis-
cal Law", focuses on the entitlement approach and its relationship to inter-
national fiscallaw. Earlier discussions of how international fiscallaw can be
justified have essentially been listings of different considerations that might
be taken into account. This paper aims to contribute to a more systematic
analysis of these issues by discussing to what extent different theories of dis-
tributive justice can justify the main elements of international fiscallaw. The
paper shows that the main features of international fiscallaw presupposes an
entitlement approach to the distribution of tax rights. However, it also shows
that the main normative traditions that conforms with this approach would
question the set of connecting factors that are identified as a legal basis for
taxation in internationallaw, either because it is too inclusive or because it
does not include some morally relevant types of relationships, or both. Fur-
thermore, the paper argues that the entitlement approach and international
fiscal law is incompatible with the cosmopolitanism of important traditions
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in moral philosophy. Cosmopolitan moral theories would object both to the
way in which the entitlement approach conceives the delimitation of fiscal
jurisdictions and to its distributional implications.
The second paper in this dissertation, "National and International Jus-
tice in Bi-lateral Tax Treaties" , applies the assignment approach and studies
the choice between two ways to distribute the right to tax capital income
between countries, the residence principle and the source principle.' The
choice of international tax principle affects countries' ability to redistribute
between capital owners and workers. However, it also affects the distribution
of income between capital importing and capital exporting countries. The
paper shows that this choice, at least partly, is a choice between national
and international inequality. It also argues that from the perspective of cos-
mopolitan moral theories there might be situations where the source principle
is preferable to the residence principle because the source principle can re-
duce international inequality by allowing poor capital importing countries a
larger share of the tax revenues.
3 Economic integration and political division
A central theme in this dissertation, and in the international tax literature,
is the problems that arise when an integrated economic area consists of more
than one jurisdiction. This creates situations where decisions made by one
jurisdiction affects the welfare of citizens of other jurisdiction. In particular
tax policy in one country might affect the well-being of taxpayers in other
countries. Tax policy in one country affects the welfare of other countries
both directly trough the prices faced by foreigners and indirectly through the
effect on foreign governments tax revenues (Dahlby 1996). The fundamental
problem is the absence of an international government that can take into
account the 'global' effects of fiscal policies on resource allocation and in-
come distribution. Several of the papers in the dissertation address different
aspects of this problem.
The paper "Tax Treaties and the Marginal Cost of Funds" studies how
the existence of international tax externalities affects the cost of financing
lUnder the residence principle the country where the capital owner is a resident has
the right to tax the global capital income irrespectively of where the capital is invested.
Under the source principle a country has the exclusive right to tax all capital income that
arises within its borders.
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public goods. In particular it analyses the marginal cost of public funds un-
der different international tax regimes when the government has a uniform,
broad-based value added tax as its only source of revenue and when coun-
tries produce both tradeable and non-tradeable goods.f Using the concepts
of direct and indirect tax externalities developed by Bev Dahlby (1996), it
distinguishes between national and international marginal cost of funds, and
explores the effects of a bilateral tax treaty that eliminates double taxa-
tion through the universal application of either the destination principle or
the origin principle." Without non-tradeable goods the destination principle
eliminates all tax externalities and secures an efficient provision of public
goods. The paper shows that this result no longer holds when non-tradeable
goods are introduced. Furthermore, it shows that we cannot generally say
whether a regime with a tax treaty results in a better allocation of resources
between public and private goods than a regime without a tax treaty and
that we cannot say whether a destination principle should be preferred to a
origin principle.
Two other papers in the dissertation also analyse problems that arise
because an integrated economic area consists of more than one jurisdiction.
The paper" National and International Distributive Justice in Bi-lateral Tax
Treaties" introduced above focuses on so-called capital tax competition and
tries to incorporate the effects on both national and international equity in
the choice of tax principles. In the next section we shall discuss the paper
"Redistribution and the Size of Jurisdictions". This paper also assumes the
existence of interjurisdictional tax externalities, but shows that eliminating
these externalities by reducing the number of jurisdictions might have an
adverse effect on redistribution.
4 Political centralization and social segrega-
tion
While political jurisdictions typically are smaller than economic areas, peo-
ples attachments are strongest to groups that are smaller than the political
2Non-tradeable goods are goods that can be consumed by foreign residents in the
country where they are produced, e.g. hotel-, restaurant- and other services.
3The destination principle gives the exclusive right to tax to the importing country
(the country of destination), while the origin principle gives the exclusive right to tax to
the exporting country (the country of origin).
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unit. The last two papers in the dissertation studies the effect of having
jurisdictions that extend beyond the groups which a person is attached to.
The starting point of both these papers is that people are limited altruists
in the sense that they only care about a limited number of other individ-
uals. The importance of this assumption is evident when we keep in mind
that redistributive policies typically are determined through democratic pro-
cedures. In a representative democracy redistributive policies that secure
the welfare of its minorities require the voluntary support of a majority of
its citizens. Obtaining such support is only possible if there exists a feel-
ing of identification on the part of the citizens and strong alliances between
them. One particular danger lies in the alienation between rich and poor
individuals. Many western societies are characterized by a relatively affluent
majority and a marginalized minority of unemployed, unskilled, disabled or
old. Transfers between the rich majority and the poor minority will typically
depend on the majority's feeling of solidarity with, and responsibility for, the
minority.
The paper "Inequality, Segregation, and Redistribution", co-authored
with Kjetil Bjorvatn, uses the idea of limited altruism to explain why egali-
tarian countries might redistribute more than inegalitarian countries. Main-
stream economic theory predicts that countries with large inequalities in
pre-tax income distribution will tend to be more redistributive than coun-
tries which are more equal in this respect. Empirical studies, however, offer
no strong support for this theoretical prediction. In fact, a number of stud-
ies indicate that the opposite may be true, namely that countries which are
more equal in terms of pre-tax income distribution tend to redistribute more
than less egalitarian societies. The paper offers an explanation to this puz-
zle. In a model of endogenous choice of location and endogenous degree of
altruism, it demonstrates that large pre-tax differences in income may lead
to a residential segregation of rich and poor. Such segregation may then in
turn reduce the social attachment between rich and poor and the willingness
of the rich to make transfers to the poor. Conversely, societies with small
pre-tax differences in income may be characterized by larger transfers and a
less segregated population structure.
The final paper, "Redistribution and the Size of Jurisdictions", analyses
the relationship between the size of jurisdictions and the degree of redistri-
bution. The paper questions the claim, well know from the fiscal federalism
literature, that redistribution should take place at the centrallevel, by show-
ing that a territorial delimitation of fiscal jurisdiction, and decentralization
9
of tax policy, might be justified even when the sole purpose of fiscal policy
is to redistribute between rich. In addition to the assumption of limited al-
truism, the paper assumes that people are impure altruists. When people
are impure altruists their willingness to help is, at least partly, motivated
by the pleasure, or warm glow feeling, that the act of helping gives and not
by the interest in the welfare of others as such. The paper shows that an
increase in the size of jurisdictions decreases the degree of tax competition
and reduce the cost of redistribution. However, it also reduces the weight
given to minority interests by the majority. The number of jurisdictions that
maximizes global welfare is therefore given by a trade-off between these two
forces.
The relationship between redistribution and country size established in
this paper can be seen as a contribution to some of the normative questions
mentioned in section 2. Many writers on international justice have been con-
cerned with the apparent tension between the universality of cosmopolitan
moral theories and existence of nation-states with responsibility for redistri-
bution within their territory. The paper shows that it makes sense from a
utilitarian point of view, to let people who care about each other's welfare
be responsible for each other's welfare and this might justify a delimitation
of fiscal jurisdictions.
5 Final Remarks
This dissertation is not a unified work and it is difficult to draw conclusions
from the work as a whole. However, some general remarks seems justified on
the basis of the five papers.
First, seen together the papers might contribute to a better understanding
of the relationship between political and economic integration. The second
and the third paper show that in a situation in which political jurisdictions
are small relative to the economic area, the outcome might be suboptimal
with respect to resource allocation and income distribution compared with
the cooperative optimum. The last essay, however, shows that when political
jurisdictions become large compared with the size of social communities the
result might be suboptimal as well. The dissertation thus suggest that there
might be a trade-off between the effects on interjurisdictional externalities
and the effects on social segregation in questions of enlargement of political
units
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Second, the dissertation also shed some light on why smail countries with
a highly egalitarian wage structure, such as the Nordic countries, have been
the countries most concerned with income redistribution. The dissertation
suggests that this phenomenon could be explained by two effects. First, a
relatively equal pre-tax wage distribution might result in a less segregated
society and such societies might be more willing to help a poor minority.
Second, people in small countries might be more motivated by the warm-
gloweffect to help each other.
Finally, the papers illustrate the importance of introducing normative
theory into the analysis of international tax regimes. The choice of inter-
national tax principles affects both national and international income distri-
bution. Both normative theory and economic theory therefore need to be
developed so as to take account of these effects. There are reasons to believe
that this type of analysis will become increasingly important. The process of
economic integration increases the effect the distribution of tax rights have
on national and international income distribution. To the extent that gov-
ernments are motivated by a concern with international justice a normative
analysis of the just distribution of the right to tax is necessary in order to
suggest in what direction we might want to change the existing international
tax regime. Furthermore, globalisation also give rise to new and difficult
questions of international tax right distribution. In particular, the growth
in international political institutions, the increased importance of multina-
tional companies and the dawn of the internet age represent challenges that
can only be met by rethinking international fiscal law.
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Chapter 2
Moral Theory and International Fiscal Law *
Abstract
According to international fiscal law a country has the legal right
to tax if certain types of connections exist between the country and the
tax subject. The paper argues that this way of distributing the right
to tax presupposes the view that particular relationships give rise to
special obligations. The paper analyses different versions of this ap-
proach and discusses to what extent they are able to justify the main
features of international tax law and the way in which fiscal jurisdic-
tions are delimited. Objections to this approach from cosmopolitan
moral theories are also discussed.
1 Introduction
A fundamental feature of a sovereign state is its ability, and right, to levy
taxes. Without the power to appropriate economic resources a state would
be unable to redistribute resources among its citizens and provide public
goods. According to international fiscal law the right to tax requires some
sort of relevant connection between the taxing jurisdiction and the tax base.
International transactions giverise to situations wheremore than one country
have a relevant connecting factor to the same tax base. In order to avoid
double taxation it is necessary to establish rules, or co-called international
tax principles, determining how the right to tax should be distributed among
*1want to thank Herman Cappelen, Andreas Føllesdal, Raino Malnes, Hilde Nagel,
Ole Gjems-Onstad, David Lyons, Thomas Pogge, Agnar Sandmo and Samuel SchefHerfor
valuable comments on earlier versions ofthis paper. Financial support from the Norwegian
Research Council (the Ethics-program) is gratefully acknowledged.
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countries so as to limit the type of connections that gives a country a legal
right to tax. This is the primary task of the bilateral tax treaties. There
is a large, and steadily increasing number, of such agreements. By reducing
the problem of double taxation they have been an important precondition
for increased international trade and economic integration.
The international distribution of the right to tax affects countries' ability
to redistribute resources nationally as well as the international distribution
of tax revenues. Integration of the world economy makes the question of
how the right to tax should be distributed increasingly important. If the
interests of countries coincide we could view the choice of international tax
principles from a purely national point of view. However,if countries differ in
their preferences, or other characteristics, their preferred choice of principle
will not generally coincide. It is then interesting to ask what constitutes a
just international distribution of tax rights.' There are two fundamentally
different ways of approaching this question. The first is what we will call
the entitlement approach. According to this approach certain connecting
factors between a tax base and a country gives the country an entitlement,
or a non-derivative right, to appropriate these economic resources. Some-
what simplified one could say that the entitlement approach views a coun-
try's right to tax, and the corresponding tax liability of the tax subject, as
deriving from special duties that we have to persons or groups we have par-
ticular relationships to.2 The alternative approach is what we will call the
assignment approach. Within this approach international tax principles are
viewed as pragmatic rules derived from general moral considerations. The
just principles of taxation are those that distribute, or assign, tax rights in
such a way as to maximise some general objective. The assignment approach
thus rejects the notion of special duties and views the just distribution of
1It is important to distinguish between redistributive taxation and benefit taxation
in discussing why a jurisdiction is justified in levying taxes. Benefit taxes could be seen
as user charges; taxes that are paid by the tax subject to cover the expenses he causes
through the use of goods and services provided by the government. Redistributive taxes,
on the other hand, are taxes that have as their main objective to redistribute resources
between individuals or groups. Taxes are also levied for other reasons, e.g. to correct
for externalities or to stabilise the economy. Even if other types of taxes poses some
interesting normative questions, this paper primarily discusses the justification for redis-
tributive taxes. This allows the paper to focus on the relationship between the principles
of international taxation and theories of distributive justice.
2We use the term special duties in a broad sense, so as to include include obligations
that derive from voluntary agreements or contracts.
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tax rights simply as the best way to implement the general duties we have
towards everyone as human beings.
This paper focus on the entitlement approach and its relationship to in-
ternational fiscallaw. Earlier discussions of how international fiscallaw can
be justified have essentially been listings of different types of considerations
that should be taken into account in choosing tax principles (see Pires 1989,
Martha 1989,Musgrave and Musgrave1972or VogeI1997). This paper aims
to contribute to a more systematic analysis of these issues by discussing to
what extent different theories of distributive justice can justify the main el-
ements of international fiscallaw.
Section 2 belowpresents the main features of international fiscal law and
how bilateral tax treaties have tried to limit the types of connections that
give countries a right to tax. The next section, section 3, argues that the
entitlement approach is required to give a normative justification of existing
international fiscal law. Different traditions within this approach are pre-
sented and it is discussedwhether theories within these traditions can justify
the legal basis for taxation in international fiscal law and to what extent
they support particular international tax principles. Section 4 discusseshow
the delimitation of fiscal jurisdiction might affect the justification of inter-
national fiscallaw. The assignment approach and its main objection to the
entitlement approach, the distributional objection, are discussed in section
5. Finally, section 6 summarises some of the results and discusses possible
policy implications.
2 International Fiscal Law and Principles of
International Taxation
Who is entitled to collect any particular tax is one of the oldest problems
of taxation (Pires 1989, ch. VI). Before the establishment of strong nation
states, disputes over this question were frequent. With the establishment of
nation states such conflicts were greatly reduced, mainly due to what has
come to be known as the principle of territoriality. In its most general form
the principle of territoriality states that a country has complete sovereignty,
within its territory, but no such rights outside its territory. International
fiscallaw has maintained the main idea underlying the principle of territori-
ality, that there must exist a particular relationship between a country and a
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tax base if the country is to have a legal right to tax a person, a transaction
or a property (Biehl1982). However, international fiscallaw also recognises
some non-territorial connections as a justifiable basis for taxation. The con-
nections that give countries a legal right to tax are essentially tax liability
relationships. This means that the existence of the connections makes the
tax subject obligated to make a financial contribution (Knechtle 1979, p. 35).
The total sum of these obligations is commonly called the tax liability.
According to international fiscal law, the connections between a country
and a tax subject that give rise to tax liability can be of both personal
and economic nature. Two types of personal attachments are recognised as
legal bases for the right to tax. First, a country has the legal right to tax
all its citizens, irrespectively of where they live or where they earn their
income. Secondly, a country has the legal right to tax all individuals that
reside within its territory, even if they are not citizens. International law
also allows countries to tax in the absence of any personal connection if there
exists an economic connection by location of economic activity or economic
assets. Personal connections, both citizenship and residence, give rise to
full, or unlimited, tax liability, while economic attachments only give rise to
limited tax liability. A country has, in other words, the legal right to tax the
global income of all its citizens and residents, but it can only tax the income
that arise within its own borders in the absence of such connections. In
practice most countries, with a notable exception in the USA, exempt their
citizens from taxation if they both live abroad and receive all their income
from foreign sources.
Several features of international fiscallaw should be noted. First, charac-
teristics of a country, e.g. that it is poor, or of the tax subject, e.g. her ability
to pay, do not constitute any legal justification of taxation. It is only the
existence of particular relationships between the country and the tax subject
that might give a country the legal right to tax. Second, only a limited set
of such relationships give rise to the right to tax. In particular, historical
relationships, e.g. former residence or former citizenship, do not create tax
liabilities. Third, relationships that give countries a legal right to tax do not
necessarily give rise to the same tax liabilities. As noted above, a purely
economic relationship only gives rise to a limited tax liability, while personal
connections, either residence or citizenship, gives the country the right to
tax the global income of the tax subjects. Finally, international fiscal law
regulates the distribution of tax rights between sovereign nations and it does
not recognise the tax right of any other groups or entities.
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2.1 Overlap of fiscal jurisdictions
Mobility of individuals, factors of production and commodities between ju-
risdictions gives rise to situations where the same tax subject or tax ob-
ject has an economicor personal connection to more than one jurisdiction.
Economic integration has therefore made overlap of tax jurisdictions more
common. Such situations typically lead to so-called double taxation, that
international transactions are taxed more than once." This problem has
concerned economists and policy makers, since double taxation means that
income from international transactions are taxed at a higher rate than der
mestic transactions and this results in less gain from trade and inefficient
allocation of resources.
The overlap of tax jurisdictions can be interpreted in two ways. First,
it can be seen as reflecting that the tax subject has tax liabilities towards
more than one jurisdiction. In this case it is not necessarily correct to give
one country the exclusiveright to tax. A second interpretation could be that
the international fiscal law allowstaxation on the basis of too many types of
connections. The choiceof tax principles, and the bi-lateral tax treaties, can
accordinglybe seen either as a way to distribute revenuesbetween legitimate
claimants or as an attempt to identify the morally relevant connection and
limit the basis of taxation to this.
In order to eliminate double taxation bilateral tax treaties establish prin-
ciples of international taxation. These principles are conflict rules that stip-
ulate which holder of a taxing power is competent to tax a particular tax
object, or parts of a tax object, in the case of an overlap of tax systems
(Knechtle 1979, pp.65-67).4 In the bilateral tax treaties the right to tax
income is commonly given either to the source country or to the residence
country. The rule that the country of residence is given the exclusiveright to
3FoUowing Biehl, we use the term transaction to designate aU economic activity which
can possibly be taxed. National transactions which exclusively tax place inside a national
territory are only subjected to the respective national legislation. International transac-
tions, on the contrary, can be affected by two or more national tax legislation, depending
on whether or not each national authority succeeds in identifying or localizing (at least
part of) these activities inside its national territory. (BiehI1982, p. 190).
4These principles only provide a limitation of the conceivable connecting factors and
such limiting factors do not necessarily prevent international double taxation. Even when
such limitations on the connecting factors exist there might still be more than one jurisdic-
tion with such connecting factors. Furthermore, overlap of tax claims might arise because
states rely on different connecting factors.
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tax is called the residence principle and rule that country of source is given
the exclusive right to tax is called the source principle." Some countries
maintain the right to tax the global income of all their citizens. We shall
call the view that the country of citizenship should have the exclusive right
to tax the citizenship principle. Combinations of these principles are also
possible, in particular the residence principle is commonly combined with a
withholding tax levied by the source country. The source country is under
this regime typically allowedto levy a fixed tax on the shared tax base and
this tax is fully credited by the residence country. The tax revenue is thus
shared between the two countries.
The choiceof international tax principles has been central in the literature
on international taxation. The economic literature has focused on the effect
different principles have on the allocation of savings and investments between
countries and on the cost of public funds (see Frenkel et. al 1991 for an
overview). Sometheorists have also studied howdifferent principles affect the
international distribution of tax revenues (e.g. Musgrave and Musgrave 1972
and Cappelen 2000a). However,neither the legal nor the economic literature
on international taxation have made systematic attempts to justify the main
elements of international fiscallaw that is the basis for these principles. Below
we present different traditions within what we have called the entitlement
approach and discuss to what extent these traditions are able to justify the
way in which the right to tax is distributed between countries or to suggest
how the legal basis for taxation should be limited.
3 The Entitlement Approach
According to the entitlement approach the right to levy taxes on a particular
tax base belongs to a country in a way that is analogous to the way in
which a person has an entitlement to a thing. This tax base entitlement
is based on some special relationship between the taxing jurisdiction the
tax subject or tax object. The analogy should, however, not be overdrawn
since the way in which a country could be said to acquire the right to tax is
fundamentally different from the way in which an individual could be said to
5These are principles for taxation of income. Analogous principles for commodity
taxation are the principle of destination (Le. the right to tax a commodity falls on the
importing country) and the principle oforigin (Le. the country that exports the commodity
has the right to tax it). SeeBiehl (1982) for a general taxonomy.
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acquire a property right. In the case of redistributive taxation, a person's tax
liabilities to a country could be seen as reflecting a distributional obligation
towards the individuals within that country. As noted above, the entitlement
approach holds that such obligations require some particular connections to
the country. This requirement express the view that such relationships give
rise to special distributive obligations over and above those that derive from
general duties. The question of how the right to tax should be distributed
is therefore closely linked to the question of how the distributive group is
constituted. If one defends the view that the distribution of tax rights should
be done on the basis of particular connecting factors one must argue that
distributive obligations are different and more extensive within a the group
defined by these connecting factors than outside the group.
One might distinguish between different traditions within the entitlement
approach according to what type of relationship is viewedas morally relevant.
Belowwe present three traditions that fall within the entitlement approach;
the mutual benefit tradition, the communitarian tradition, and the volun-
tarist tradition. The common feature of these traditions is that they hold
that we have, or could have, different and more extensive distributional obli-
gations towards particular individuals if we stand in a special relationship to
these individuals. However,the nature and extent of the redistributive obli-
gations that arise from special relationships generally depend on the nature
of the relationship in question.
3.1 The mutual benefit tradition
David Hume, and more recently John Rawls and David Gauthier, have char-
acterised the existence and necessity of social co-operation as part of the" cir-
cumstances of justice" (Hume 1777, pp. 145-153,Rawls 1971, pp. 126-130
and Gauthier 1985, pp. 10-14). According to this tradition society should
be understood as "a co-operative venture for mutual advantages" marked
both with identity of interests and conflict (Rawls 1971, p. 126). Social
co-operation makes possible a better life for everyone through the increase
in production that results from joining forces. But there is also a conflict
of interests since everyone prefers a larger to a lesser share of the benefits
produced by their co-operation. This tradition is an entitlement approach
in the sense that distributive obligations arise from a particular relationship;
co-operation in order to create a social surplus. According to the mutual
benefit tradition, distribution should therefore take place among those who
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participate in social cooperation. A crucial question within this tradition
is how the concept of social cooperation is construed. The answer to this
question affects both who are seen as participants in social cooperation and
what is considered the social surplus to be divided among the participants.
If social cooperation is interpreted as economic cooperation, the mutual
benefit tradition would hold that economic relationships give rise to special
distributive obligations between the participants. It might seem reasonable
to assume that economic cooperation primarily takes place where goods and
services are produced, because this is where economic values are created. If
this assumption is correct this interpretations of the mutual benefit tradition
suggests that only economic relationships give rise to tax liabilities and that
the source principle should apply. The view that economic allegiance is the
source of the right to tax has a long tradition in the literature on international
taxation. A late 19th century German author, George von Schantz, presented
this view in 1892 and argued for the use of the source principle along these
lines, i.e. that economic relationship should be the sole basis for tax rights.
If social cooperation is construed as economic cooperation it is only the
cooperative surplus, and not the total production, that should be distributed.
This seems to give moral support to the view that economic connections only
give rise to limited tax liabilities.
A problem with using economic relationships as a basis for the distribu-
tion of tax rights is related to the difficulties involved in identifying where
values are created in the case of international transactions. It is commonly
assumed that values are created in the country of production. However, with
multinational companies it is often difficult to identify the country of produc-
tion. This problem is even more pronounced with the new internet economy.
Furthermore, it could be argued that values are created in the countries in
which the goods are sold, or in the countries where they are consumed, and
not in the countries where they are produced.
More importantly, it is not obvious that the notion of social cooperation
in the mutual benefit tradition should be construed in purely economic terms.
For some writers, such as Rawls, society as a whole, not just its economy,
should be conceived of as a cooperative scheme from which everyone receives
a wide range of economic and non-economic benefits. Given this interpreta-
tion of social cooperation, the mutual benefit tradition would also identify
residence as source of tax liabilities since residing within a territory normally
is sufficient for participation in the prevailing scheme of cooperation. This
suggests that the right to tax should be divided between the source country
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and the residence country, e.g. through a system where the country of source
is given a right to levy a withholding tax.
Two features of international fiscal law seem difficult to reconcile with
the mutual benefit tradition. First, all theories within this tradition would
reject relationships that do not involvesome sort of social cooperation as the
basis for tax rights. It could therefore be argued that the claim that mere
citizenship is a sufficientbasis for taxation is incompatible with the mutual
benefit tradition, since citizenship does not necessarily imply any type of
economic or social interaction." Second, international fiscal law does not
considerhistorical relationships to be legal grounds for taxation. This feature
does not conformwellwith the mutual benefit tradition since it implies that
an individual might enjoy the benefits of social cooperation without ever
contributing herself."
The mutual benefit tradition also seem to have some implications for the
choice of bi-lateral tax treaties. In particular it seems that one way to limit
the right to tax; the residence principle, is incompatible with the mutual
benefit tradition since this principle does not give the country of source any
share of the tax revenues.
3.2 The communitarian tradition
According to the communitarian tradition an individual is partly defined by
her relationships and the various rights and obligations that go along with
these, so these commitments themselves form a basic element of personal-
ity (Miller 1988, p. 648). Rights and obligations are therefore, at least
partly, defined between members of particular societies or communities at
particular times." The morally relevant type of connection thus seems to
be social and/or cultural relationships. To the extent that a person has
6Somewriters argue that citizenship should be viewed as a cooperative enterprise for
mutual benefit, but it is hard to see how this could be in the case in the absence of these
types of interaction.
7This possibility is particularly important in situations where so-called 'brain drain' is
a problem or when migration patterns are systematically related to different life stages, so-
called life time migration. These phenomena might undermine the possibility of financing
public goods, such as health care and education, given this feature of international fiscal
law.
8Most communitarians would accept that there exist moral constraints on our behaviour
with respect to persons outside our group, but maintain that these are of a different kind
or less extensive than those towards members of our community.
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other, and more extensive, obligations towards individuals within the same
community, the communitarians would argue that delimitation of fiscal juris-
dictions should correspond to the such communities. Clearly, an important
and difficult question within this tradition is how the concept of community
is construed and what type of attachments and loyalties that constitute a
community.
Without attempting to give a precise definition of the term community
it might seem reasonable to assume that an individual generally would be a
member of the community where she resides. If this were the case the com-
munitarian tradition could be seen as justifying the tax right of the residence
country. The communitarian tradition could also be said to support the tax
right of the country of citizenship, inasmuch as citizens consider themselves
to be members of a single civic community.
The main problem with communitarianism as a justification of interna-
tional fiscallaw is the fact that people identify with communities on different
terms and this results in a fundamental ambiguity as to how the distribu-
tional community should be construed. Furthermore, it is difficult to justify
taxation on the basis of economic relationships within the communitarian
tradition, since it is possible to have income from a country without having
any social or cultural ties to that country. The communitarian tradition also
seems incompatible with the practice that the native country, or the coun-
try of former residence, has no legal right to tax the income that accrues
to an individual that permanently has left the country, because membership
in a community, or a society, not necessarily are affected by a change in
residence."
The main implication that the communitarian tradition has for the for-
mulation of the bilateral tax treaties concerns the use of the source principle.
This tradition seems to be incompatible with the source principle since it
does not give the community to which the tax subject belongs any right to
tax that persons income.
3.3 The voluntarist tradition
According to the voluntarist tradition, distributional obligations only arise
from voluntary contractual relationships. Mere participation in a relationship
9What constitutes permanently leaving a country may vary. Often the criteria for
residence are such that a person is considered a resident in two countries at the same time.
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is not sufficient to give rise to special responsibilities, such responsibilities
must always arise from some voluntary act. Applied to the question of the
distribution of tax rights this implies that tax liabilities only arise from rela-
tionships that are entered into voluntarily by the tax subject. The concept
of voluntary agreement is important to the different versions of voluntarism.
How this concept is construed will determine what type of relationships that
constitute a justifiable basis for taxation.
The best know voluntarist tradition is libertarianism. According to this
theory all individuals have certain basic liberties or rights, such as the right to
life and health, to property and to liberty. These rights constitute the bounds
of individual freedom of action which people cannot transgress. Individuals
have these rights irrespective of the existence of any particular relationship
or institutional structures. According to the libertarian theory any state or
government has to be the result of a voluntary agreement by all individuals.
This constraint on state functions, generally implies that only certain limited
and specific tasks should be undertaken by the state. A libertarian theory
of distributive justice contains a principle of just acquisition of resources, a
principle of just transfer of resources, and a principle of rectification of past
injustice, but there is no principle of redistribution.l" Transfers of resources
between individuals might be legitimate, however, if it is a result of a process
that does not violate any individual rights, a result of voluntary contracts.
Robert Nozick argues that even if the framework is libertarian, individual
communities within it need not be, and perhaps no community chooses to
be so (Nozick 1974, p. 320). Redistributional schemes could be perfectly
legitimate in so far as they take place within voluntary communities.
It could be argued that continued citizenship, or other types of political
association, represents some sort of tacit consent to the redistributive policy
within that group. One argument for viewing states as voluntary associa-
tions would be to say that democratic elections if they are held, constitute a
periodic reaffirmation of citizens support for the institutions of the state. If
this line of argument is accepted it could constitute an argument in favour of
a citizenship principle of the type that is applied by the US and the Philip-
pines. The voluntarist tradition could also justify other type of connections
as a basis for taxation. In particular, one could argue that the choice to stay
lOlt has been argued that the so-called Lockean proviso, important in the derivation of
property rights, implies some distributive obligations irrespective of any voluntary agree-
ment, but I shall not consider this argument here.
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within a community or a state rather than to migrate could constitute an
acceptance of the institutions and laws regulating the society. This would
identify residence as a source of tax liability. A similar argument could be
made with respect to economic relationships.
The main problem with a voluntarist justification of international fiscal
law lies in the claim that the type of connections that give a country the
legal right to tax actually constitute voluntary agreements. If the concept
of voluntary agreement is interpreted strictly, e.g. so as not to include tacit
consent, none of the relationships recognised in international fiscallaw might
be considered a justifiable basis for taxation according to the voluntarist
tradition. However,given the legitimacy of the international fiscallaw, vol-
untarist theories would not object to any bilateral tax treaty that limited
the right to tax so long these treaties themselves are a result of voluntary
agreements.
4 Delimitation of fiscal jurisdiction
According to international fiscal law, the right to tax is to be distributed
between sovereign states. Within the entitlement approach this could be
seen as a claim that distributive groups constituted by special relationships
coincidewith the actual borders of the nation state. This is not the place to
ask the larger question of whether the nation state is the appropriate level of
redistribution. However,wewill discuss the more limited question ofwhether
the distributional groups identified by the different entitlement theories can
be said to coincidewith the existing fiscal jurisdictions.
Within the mutual benefit tradition the moral significanceof state borders
is based on the empirical claim that the extent of social cooperation between
countries is insignificantcomparedwith similar domestic interaction. If social
cooperation is construed in economicterms, this claim is plainly false. There
is often more economic interaction between neighboring regions of different
countries than between regions within the same country. FUrthermore, if
economic interaction is the basis for redistribution, then increased economic
integration and interdependence would require that the right to tax be vested
in institutions of progressivelywider and wider scope. In a globalized econ-
omy, it could be argued that the distributive communities constituted by
special relationships should include all of humanity. This is the position
of the so-called global Rawlsians, such as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge
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(Beitz 1975 and 1979 and Pogge 1989 and 1994). More precisely, these writ-
ers argue that the mutual-benefit logic implies that the Rawlsian maximin
principle should be applied on a global scale, rather than at the national level
(Beitz 1979).
According to the communitarian tradition, redistribution should take
place within the community. The nation state is the appropriate agency of
redistribution only if people primarily identify with their nation. However,
people tend to identify themselves with communities that are not necessarily
territorially delimited. Since individuals are members of different commu-
nities or groups it is inherently difficult to identify the relevant social and
cultural groups and to define the exact borders of such groups. Furthermore,
actual states do not coincide with social and cultural groups. Several ethnic
and religious groups generally coexist within the same country and the same
community might live in several different countries.
To the extent citizenship and/or residence could be seen as a voluntary
commitment, the nation state could be viewed as a voluntary association. In
this case, the distributive groups would coincide with the borders of nation
states. The problem with this type of argument is that it seems implausible
to claim that citizenship generally is the result of a voluntary commitment.
Only very few individuals have a real choice of citizenship or country of res-
idence. Most voluntarists, such as Nozick, would therefore argue against the
view that the nation state could be conceived as a voluntary association and
hold that distributive communities would have to be much smaller (Nozick
1974, pp. 320-23).
With the possible exception of theories that identify citizenship as the
source of distributional obligations, theories within the entitlement approach
do not seem to support the claim that redistribution primarily should take
place within the nation states. The distributive groups defined by these
theories seem to either include people who are not members of the same
jurisdiction, to exclude people who are members of the same jurisdiction, or
both. In other words: even if the entitlement approach succeeds in justifying
a particular delimitation of distributive groups it has not necessarily justified
why the right to tax should be distributed between sovereign states.
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5 The distributional objection
Accordingto the entitlement approach, the right to tax a particular tax base
can be said to belong to a country. What I have called the assignment ap-
proach rejects this idea. The basic feature of the assignment approach is the
view that we have the same distributive obligations towards every human
being and it rejects the view that special relationships give rise to special
obligations. The assignment approach takes all human beings, even distant
strangers, to be included in the scope of justice and argues that the same
principles must be used to assess both national and international income
distribution. In this sense the assignment approach is more cosmopolitan in
scope than the entitlement approach.'! The assignment approach would be
the approach taken by utilitarians such as Peter Singer and Robert Goodin
(Singer 1972and Goodin 1985,1988and 1995). Utilitarians wouldhold that
special duties should be regarded as being only "distributed general duties"
and derive the whole of their moral force from general duties (Goodin 1988,
p. 678). The utilitarians would view the just distribution of tax rights as
a question of how the distributional obligations we have towards all other
human beings best could be implemented. The assignment approach would
therefore reject the idea that jurisdictions should correspond to distinct dis-
tributive communities and question why there should be any delimitation of
tax jurisdiction in the first place. In particular it would question whether
the nation state in fact is the appropriate agency for redistribution. These
questions echo the concern, expressed by many writers on international jus-
tice, about the tension between cosmopolitan moral theories and existence
of nation states with responsibility for redistribution within its territory.
5.1 The Assigned responsibility model
Robert Goodin has developedan approach called the" assignedresponsibility
model" that can be seen as an attempt to justify the existence of nation
states within a cosmopolitan moral theory such as utilitarianism (Goodin
1988 and 1995). According to this model, state borders can be seen as
convenient ways of allocating responsibilities that themselves derive from
universal principles. Robert Goodin argues that" a great many general duties
11As noted in the last section, some writers within the entitlement approach, such
as Beitz and Pogge, would be equally cosmopolitan. Most of what is said about the
assignment approach in this section could also be said about their theories.
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point to tasks that, for one reason or another, are pursued more effectively if
they are subdivided and particular people are assigned special responsibility
for particular portions of the task" (Goodin 1995, p. 282). Often this has to
do with the advantage of specialisation and division of labour (Shue 1988).
At other times, it has to do with lumpiness in the information required to
do a good job, and the limits on people's capacity for processing requisite
quantities of information about a great many cases at once. The fact that we
are limited altruists, i.e. that we care about a limited number of other people,
constitutes another argument for delimitation of fiscal jurisdiction, since we
would want people who care about each other to take care of each other
(Cappelen 2000b). In this perspective, delimitation of fiscal jurisdictions
can be seen as a way to assign responsibility for discharging certain general
duties vis-a-vis individuals to particular state agents. This way of assigning
duties is obviously not randomly chosen, neither should the delimitation of
jurisdictions be. A particular delimitation of jurisdiction is only justified to
the extent that it assigns responsibility in the most efficient way. Accordingly,
the just principles of international taxation should in this perspective be
interpreted as the connection that constitutes the optimal basis for assigning
distributive obligations to particular groups. However, even if the assigned
responsibility model to some extent reconciles the cosmopolitan nature of
generalobligations with a territorial delimitation of fiscal jurisdiction, it can
still be used to criticise the existing jurisdictional borders.
5.2 The Distributional Objection
A characteristic feature of the entitlement approach is that it does not take
account of the that consequences the choice of tax principle has in terms of
distribution and efficiency. What we could call the distributional objection
challenges this feature of the entitlement approach. The objection points out
that benefits arising from special relationships might work to the disadvan-
tage of those who are most in need (Scheffler 1994 and 1997). This effect
is easily seen in the context of international taxation. The rich part of the
worlds population is more closely interconnected with each other, through
economic cooperation, co-residence and citizenship, than with the poor. If
the right to levy redistributive taxes is delimited to groups constituted by
such relationships the result will be that rich people take responsibility for
rich people and poor people take responsibility for poor people. The as-
signment approach would argue that it is not an efficient way of assigning
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responsibilities to put the poorly-off in charge of the poorly-offand the well-
off in charge of the well-off. If there has been a misallocation of some sort,
so that some states have been assigned care of many more people than they
have been assigned resources to care for them, then a reallocation resources
is called for (Goodin 1988,p. 685).
For a given delimitation of fiscal jurisdiction, the assignment approach
would argue that the choice between different principles in taxation should
depend on a trade-off between efficiencyconsideration, national equality and
international equality (Cappelen 2000a). Most theories within the assign-
ment approach hold that there could be situations where national equality
could be sacrificedfor the sake of international equality and that there could
be situations where both national and equality could be sacrificed for the
sake of efficiency. How this trade-off should be made would depend on the
particular moral theory.
The assignment approach is not committed to the view that the interna-
tional distribution of tax revenueshas to be related to any particular relation-
ship between the country and the tax base. Theories within this approach
would argue that tax revenues should be distributed according to character-
istics of the country (e.g. the number of inhabitants, the GDP per capita
etc.). Several theorists have proposed to use the tax system to promote in-
ternational distributive justice. Two prominent proposals have been made
by Pogge and Tobin. Pogge advocates the use of a global resource tax, while
Tobin argues the case for a tax on international currency transactions (Pogge
1998 and Tobin 1996). An alternative way to take account of international
distribution of income, could be to maintain the main features of interna-
tional fiscallaw, but allowpoor countries a larger share of tax revenues. One
way to do this could be to allowpoor countries to levy a higher withholding
tax on income, in particular capital income, that had the poor countryasits
source, but accrued to residents of rich countries (Cappelen 2000a).
6 Final Remarks
According to international fiscal law a country only has the right to tax if
there exists a particular type of relationships between the taxing jurisdiction
and the tax base. The paper has shown that the main features of interna-
tional fiscallaw presupposes what we have called an entitlement approach to
the distribution of tax rights. However, the discussion in section 3 showed
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that the main normative traditions that conforms with the entitlement ap-
proach would question the set of connecting factors that are identified as a
legal basis for taxation in internationallaw, either because it is too inclusive
or because it does not include some morally relevant types of relationships,
or both. We also showed, in section 4, that it is difficult, even within the
entitlement approach, to justify that the right to tax should be distributed
exclusivelybetween sovereignstates. Furthermore, we have argued that the
entitlement approach is incompatible with the cosmopolitanismof important
traditions in moral philosophy. Cosmopolitan moral theories would object
both to the way in which the entitlement approach conceivesthe delimitation
of fiscaljurisdictions and to its distributional implications.
The main traditions in moral philosophy thus seem unable to justify the
main features of international fiscallaw. One response to this result could be
to see it as a confirmation of the realist view; countries simply exploit their
power to tax and any agreements on tax principles are based on self interest
and bargaining power (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Countries' attempts
to justify their practice by reference to normative principles are nothing more
than cheap talk. Furthermore, the analysis above has not taken into account
problems of implementation. Lack of global enforcement mechanisms and
lack of morally relevant information might explain important parts of the
existing international fiscal law, e.g. why historical relationships are not
recognized as a legal basis for taxation.
Despite these objections to the relevanceof an analysis of the relationship
between moral theories and international fiscallaw, there are several reasons
why such considerations could be important for policy makers. First, there
are evidence that governments are motivated, at least partly, by a concern
with international justice. To the extent this is the case, a normative analysis
of the just distribution of the right to tax would suggest in what direction
we might want to change the existing international tax regime. Second, the
process of economic integration increases the effect the distribution of tax
rights has on national and international income distribution and thus makes
this an even more important policy issue. Furthermore, globalisation also
give rise to new and difficult questions of international tax right distribution.
In particular, both the increased importance ofmultinational companies and
the dawn of the internet age represent challenges that can only be met by
rethinking international fiscal law. Finally, there is a significant growth in
international political institutions, both at the regional and the global level.
Whether, and to what extent, such institutions should have tax rights will
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therefore be an important questions in the future, and an answer to this
question requires a normative theory of the right to tax.
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Chapter 3
National and International Distributive Justice in
Bilateral Tax Theaties~
Abstract
This paper analyses the choicebetween the residenceprinciple and
the sourceprinciple in international capital taxation. The focusof the
literature has been on the efficiencyaspects of the two principles. The
present paper ties in with this literature, but incorporates effects on
both national and international equity. It is shown that the choice
between the two principles of international taxation to some extent
is a choice between national and international inequality. The pa-
per argues that from the perspective of a global planner there might
be situations where the source principle is superior to the residence
principlebecause the sourceprinciple reduces international inequality.
1 Introduction
In open economies people can invest their capital outside the country in
which they are resident. This creates situations where more than one juris-
diction is able to tax capital income. In order to avoid double taxation, it
is therefore necessary to agree on a rule that determines how the right to
tax should be distributed between the countries with the power to tax (Biehl
"Forthooming in Finanzarchiv no. 4/5, volume 56.
tThis paper was presented at the conference "Capital Income Taxation: Policy Re-
quirements for Europe" in Munich, June 3-5. I am grateful to the participants for helpful
comments. In particular I would like to thank Sijbren Cnossen, Agnar Sandmo and Gut-
torm Schjelderup. I also want to thank two anonymous referees.
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1982). The choice between different types of double taxation relief, in par-
ticular the choice between the source principle and the residence principle,
has been the subject of both political and theoretical interest. An important
result in the literature on international tax policy is the inefficiency of source
taxes. Many writers have argued that residence taxation, if it could be ef-
fectively enforced, is preferalble to source taxation (Gordon 1986, Frenkel et
al. 1991, Bucovetsky and Wilson 1991 and Homburg 1999). The focus of
the literature has been on the efficiency aspects of the two principles. The
present paper ties in with this literature, but incorporates effects on both
national and international equity. It is important to include equity consider-
ations into the comparison of the two principles because the principles affect
both national and international income distribution. Differences in capital
endowments are a source of both national and international income inequal-
ity and an old theme in political and moral debate is how, and to what
extent, income inequalities generated by the uneven distribution of capital
endowments should be equalised. The choice of international tax principle
affects countries' ability to redistribute between capital owners and workers
as well as the distribution of income between capital importing and capital
exporting countries. The paper shows that this choice is, to some extent, a
choice between national and international inequality. It also argues that from
the perspective of a global planner there might be situations where the source
principle is superior to the residence principle because the source principle
can reduce international inequality.
Two differences between the source principle and the residence princi-
ple have been important in the analysis of the two principles. First, the
two principles affect the international allocation of investments and savings
differently (for an overview, see Frenkel, et al 1991). The source principle
implies that the after-tax return on investments is the same for residents of
all countries and this implies that the allocation of savings will be efficient.
However, since the tax rates might differ across countries, the before tax
return will generally not be equalised and capital will not be efficiently allo-
cated between countries. The residence principle, on the other hand, secures
efficient allocation of investments, but not of savings, since pre-tax returns
will be equalised while after-tax returns will differ. This paper ignores the
welfare loss associated with international differences in pre-tax return byas-
suming that capital is supplied inelastically. Since capital is assumed to be
perfectly mobile, differences in after-tax returns to capital create distortions.
This feature biases the model towards the residence principle. This is done
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to focus on the internat ion equity aspects of the source principle.
A second difference between the two principles concerns how they affect
the cost of financing public goods and redistributing income (Zodrow and
Mieszkowski 1986,Wildasin 1989,Wilson 1989, Sinn 1990). It is a widespread
concern that globalisation and increased mobility of the tax base increase the
marginal cost of public funds for given tax rates. When tax bases are mobile
each country has an incentive to lower its taxes in order to attract a larger
tax base. The result of such tax competition is a downward pressure on the
tax levels. The choice of tax principle affects the mobility of the tax base and
thus the degree of tax competition. Under the source principle it is costly to
redistribute resources between capital owners and workers because it is fairly
easy to move capital from one jurisdiction to another. With the residence
principle the capital owner has to take up residence in another country to
escape taxation. Since people are less mobile than capital, the problem of
tax competition will be more severe under the source principle than under
the residence principle. A small country faced with a perfectly elastic supply
of capital will be unable to set a higher capital tax rate than its trading
partners. Concerns for national redistribution would therefore favour the
residence principle over the source principle. In this paper this difference
is captured by the assumption that people are completely immobile while
capital can move freely between countries.
Principles of international taxation also affect the distribution of income
between countries. One of the main reasons why it is difficult to agree on a
common principle is that principles of international taxation differ in how the
gains from international transactions are distributed between the countries.'
With the notable exception of Peggy and Richard Musgrave (Musgrave and
Musgrave 1972) few economist have tried to introduce such considerations
into the evaluation of international tax policy. The difference between the
residence principle and the source principle may be viewed as the difference
1Another feature of the source principle is that it calls for in rem rather than personal
taxes, since it is concerned with where income arises rather than to whom it accrues (Mus-
grave 1987). It is generally necessary to have information about persons' total income or
other personal characteristics in order to levy progressive income taxes and such informa-
tion is not available about non-residents. The source principle therefore reduces the ability
of the tax system to redistribute income between groups within a jurisdiction. Unlike the
source principle, the residence principle is compatible with a personal system of income
taxation. This paper will ignore this difference between the two principles by assuming
that the government is restricted to using a unit tax on capital under both regimes.
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between taxing the net national product (its residents' world-wide income)
and taxing the net domestic product (the income produced by all factors
of production employed in that country). A capital exporting country has
a larger net national product than net domestic product. A net exporter
of capital, on the other hand, has a prima facie reason to favour the resi-
dence principle since the income that accrues to its residents from foreign
investments exceeds the income that accrues to foreign residents investing in
its country. In particular some Third World countries have argued that the
residence principle favours the industrialised, and capital rich, world since it
gives the right to tax international capital income to the capital exporting
country. The source principle on the other hand favours the capital poor
countries in two ways. First, it increases the tax base of capital importing
countries and thus the tax revenues for a given capital income tax. Secondly,
it gives the poor country a chance to attract capital by setting low tax rates
or to exploit the opportunity for tax exporting by setting high tax rates.
If the interest of countries coincided we could view the choice of tax prin-
ciple from a purely national point of view. However, if countries differ in
their preferences, in their size, in their per capita capital endowments or
other characteristics, their preferred choice of principle will not generally c0-
incide. We then need to ask what principle should be considered just from
an international point of view. There are two fundamentally different ways
of approaching this type of question. The first is what we could call the
entitlement approach (Scheffler 1994 and 1997). According to this approach
certain connecting factors between a tax base and a country gives the coun-
try an entitlement, or a non-derivative right, to appropriate these economic
resources. Somewhat simplified one could say that the entitlement approach
sees a country's right to tax as deriving from special duties that we have
to persons or groups wo whom we have a particular relationship. The al-
ternative approach could be called the assignment approach (Goodin 1995).
Within this approach international tax principles are viewed as pragmatic
rules derived from general moral considerations. The just principles of tax-
ation are those that distribute, or assign, tax rights in such a way as to
maximise some general objective. The assignment approach thus rejects the
notion of special duties and views the just distribution of tax rights simply
as the best way to implement the general duties we have towards everyone
as human beings. This paper explores the last of these two approaches and
looks at the choice between tax principles from the point of view of a social
planner concerned with the global welfare. From the point of view of the
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global welfare maximiser, the choice between the residence principle and the
source principle depends on a trade-off between efficiency consideration, na-
tional equity and international equity. The model developed below attempts
to capture this trade-off.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the model
and analyses the optimal national policy under the two principles. Section
3 introduces the perspective of the global planner and discusses under what
conditions such a planner might prefer the source principle. In section 4 we
consider the possibility of combining the residence principle with a withhold-
ing tax and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
This paper analyses the choice between different principles of international
taxation in a model with two types of people; workers and capital owners
(denoted P and R). The workers and the capital owners inelastically supply
one unit of labour or capital respectively. The national endowments of the
two factors are thus equal to the number of workers and capital owners that
are residents in the country. Capital and labour are the only two factors of
production used in the production of a single final good. We assume that
there are only two countries; one capital rich and one capital poor (denoted
1 and 2 respectively), where the rich country is assumed to have higher per
capita endowments of capital, i.e. the number of capital owners relative to
the number of workers is higher in the rich country than in the poor country.
The two countries can be thought of as two regions where each region consists
of identical countries applying a residence principle within the group.
We assume that the capital owners have a higher before-tax income than
the workers and that the average per capita income in the capital rich country
is higher than in the capital poor country. There are thus two types of
inequality in this economy. There is inequality within each country between
workers and capital owners and there is inequality between the capital rich
and the capital poor country.
Neither workers nor capital owners can change residence. Labour cannot
move from one country to another, but capital is perfectly mobile between
countries and the capital owners sell their capital where the after tax return is
highest. Since capital is supplied inelastically and there is only one final good,
the only type of inefficiency in the model is associated with the allocation of
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capital between countries.
All individuals are assumed to have the same indirect utility function,
v(f), and we assume that v' > O and v" < O. The income of the capital
owners in country i, fRi, is simply their after tax return to capital, denoted
Pi. The income of the workers in the same country, lm, is equal to the wage,
Wi, plus the lump-sum transfer, Ti.
In each country there is one firm that is assumed to behave competitively
and use a constant return to scale production function.
(1)
where K; is the capital employed in country i and Li is the labour em-
ployed in country i. We assume that the technology in the capital rich coun-
try is at least as productive as the technology in the capital poor country,
i.e. that F1(K, L) ~ F2(K, L) for any (K, L). Normalising the price of the
final good to one, the firm's profit is given by
(2)
where ui; is the unit cost of labour (the wage) in country i and ri is the
unit cost of capital in the same country. From the Euler theorem we know
that the firm earns zero profit. The first order conditions of this optimisation
problem imply that
(3)
8Fi
8K
i
= ri
Since each worker is assumed to supplyone unit of labour inelastically,
the wage is residually determined as ui, = 8Fi(Ki, Li)/8Li, where Li is the
number of workers in country i. The labour supplied by the workers in the two
countries is assumed to be homogenous. Any international difference in wages
must therefore be a result of either international differences in technology or
in the amount of capital invested per worker. From the first-order conditions
(4)
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we can derive the demand for capital in country i as a function of the price
of capital, Ki(ri).
The governments are assumed to be nationalistic in the sense that they
only take account of the welfare of their own residents in determining their
tax policy. Each country tries to maximise the utility of its citizens using
a unit tax, ti, on capital and a lump sum transfer, T;., to its workers. We
assume that the governments do not have the ability to discriminate against
outfiowing capital or capital owned by non-residents. The government is
assumed to maximise
(5)
where Ki is the number of capital owners in country i, subject to
TT - L·T.· > O.L.I.i t t_ (6)
where IIi is the government revenue function. Since the tax base is dif-
ferent under the two principles the revenue function depends on the interna-
tional tax regime. Below we study the solution to the government optimisa-
tion problem under the residence principle and under the source principle.
2.1 The residenceprinciple
Under the residence principle the country where the capital owner is a res-
ident has the right to tax the global capital income irrespective of where
the capital is invested. Since we assume that capital owners can costlessly
move their capital to the country with the highest return we know that an
equilibrium in the capital market requires that a capital owner residing in a
country, i, has the same after-tax return, Pi, in both countries, i.e.
(7)
which implies that rI = r2, i.e. that the marginal product of capital must
be the same in both countries. The demand for capital in each country is
then given by KiR = Ki(r), where r denotes the common pre-tax return to
capital and where the superscript denotes the regime. The market clearing
condition can be written as
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(8)
from which we derive the common pre-tax rate ofreturn, r = r([(l +[(2),
as a function of the total amount of capital in the two countries. The pre-tax
return to capital and the allocation of capital between the two countries are,
in other words, independent of the tax policy in the two countries. As noted
above, global efficiency in production requires that the marginal product of
capital is the same in all countries, otherwise it would be possible to reallocate
capital between the countries and increase world production. The residence
principle satisfies this requirement. The principle does not generally secure an
efficient allocation of savings. However, since capital is supplied inelastically
in this model this does not create any distortions. The government revenue
function under the residence principle is given by
(9)
and the Lagrangian can be written as
The first-order conditions of this problem are given by
(11)
(12)
aLi - -- = tiKi - TiLi = OaAi
where v~ = v'(r - ti) and v~i = V'(Wi + Ti), Using (11) and (12) we get
(13)
(14)
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Since the capital tax is a lump-sum tax under this regime, this is what we
would expect from a utilitarian government; that redistribution takes place
until the marginal utility of income is equal for both workers and capital
owners. This implies that the incomes of the two groups have to be equal,
i.e. that r - ti = Wi +~. Using (14) we know that the common after-tax
income under this regime, If, is given by
(15)
The expression in the nominator on the right-hand side is the net national
income in country i. Since capital income tax is effectively a lump-sum tax
the government in each country can secure a first-best distribution of the
net national income so that both workers and capital owners have the same
income. However, while there will be national income equality in both coun-
tries there might be considerable international inequality. This inequality
depends on the international distribution of capital endowments and on the
differences in production technology in each country.
2.2 The source principle
Under the source principle each country has the exclusive right to tax all
capital income that arises within its borders. Under this regime it is possible
for capital owners to escape taxation in their own country by moving their
capital to another jurisdiction. In equilibrium, capital must therefore have
the same after-tax returns in both countries:
(16)
Denoting the common after-tax return to capital as p, we know that the
demand for capital will be a function Kr = Ki(p+ti), where the superscript
denotes the tax regime. The capital market equilibrium condition under the
source principle can be written as
(17)
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from which we obtain as a function of the tax rates in the two countries,
p = p(tI,t2). By implicit differentiation of (17) we have that Bp/åti =
-Kt'/(Kr' + Kt) and we observe that O< Bp/åti < -1. An increase in
the tax in one country reduces the common international after-tax return to
capital. The source principle thus introduces an interdependence between
the tax policies in the two countries. This effect, whereby the tax policy in
one country changes the prices faced by non-nationals, is commonly referred
to as tax exporting. Using the terminology introduced by Dahlby (1996) we
can describe tax exporting as a direct tax externality in the sense that it
directly affects the indirect utility function of non-nationals and this effect is
not taken into account by the taxing country. For a capital tax levied in a
capital importing country, the direct tax externality will be unambiguously
negative. However, if the tax is levied by a capital exporting country, the
tax externality may be positive as the country will worsen its terms of trade
by imposing a source tax on capital. We have assumed that firms behave
competitively, and the terms of trade effect will therefore result in increased
pre-taxed wages in the capital importing country. The size and sign of the
direct externality will in general depend on the effect an increase in the tax
rate has on the international after-tax return to capital and on the share of
the total capital owned by the taxing country.
The government 's revenue under the source principle is not related to
the endowments of capital, but to the capital invested in the country. The
revenue function is given by
(18)
This revenue function constitutes a source of tax competition in the sense
that the countries have an incentive to lower their taxes in order to attract
capital. Tax competition between the countries is a positive indirect tax exter-
nality in the sense that the governments tax decisions affect the tax revenues
of other governments and thus their ability to provide public goods or redis-
tribute income. It is a positive tax externality in the sense that an increase
in the tax in one country results in migration of capital to other jurisdictions
and thus increases the tax base of these countries. The Lagrangean of the
governments optimisation problem under the source principle is given by
(19)
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The first-order conditions are:
(20)
(21)
BLi s' - Ti Li
BAi = t.K; - TiLi = O, ti = Kr
From condition (20) we observe that the effects of an increase in the capi-
tal tax under the source principle differs from the effects under the residence
principle in three interesting ways. Firstly we have the fact that the after-
tax return to capital may fall by less than the tax, i.e. that Bp/ ati > -l.
Secondly, an increase in a country's unit tax has a negative effect on wages,
through the effect on domestic investments, an effect that is not present un-
der the residence principle. The third difference is that the tax base under
the source principle is the capital invested in the country and not the capital
endowments.
From the chain rule and the factor price frontier we have that ~ = ~ ~
and that BWi/Bri = -(Kr/Li) (Bucovetsky and Wilson 1991). Furthermore,
from (17) we have that 8ri/ati = (1+Bp/ati). Using (20)-(21) we then get
(22)
(23)
where CKi= -h8:{. The expression on the left-hand side can be seen
as a measure of the 'degree of national redistribution. When the measure is
equal to one there is complete equalisation of after-tax income within the
country. For values lower than one the capital owners have a higher after-tax
income than the workers and for values above one the workers have higher
after-tax income than the capital owners. We observe that the degree of
redistribution depends on three effects. Firstly, the cost of redistribution
depends on the ratio between the tax base and the capital endowment of its
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capital owners. The larger the endowments of capital that a country has,
the larger the share of the tax burden that will be born by its own capital
owners. Secondly, the degree of redistribution depends on the elasticity of
the tax base. An increase in the elasticity of the tax base increases the
cost of redistribution and thus reduces the degree of redistribution. Finally,
redistribution between workers and capital owners can only take place to
the extent the country is able to affect the after-tax return to capital. If
is ap/ Bti small, most of the tax burden will be shifted on to the immobile
factor, labour, in terms of lower wages.
With the residence principle each country is able to achieve the first-
best distribution of its national income. A country therefore prefers the
residence principle to the source principle when the net national product
under the residence principle exceeds the net domestic product under the
source principle. If the net domestic product under the source principle is
larger than the net national product under the residence principle there will
be a trade-off between the size of the tax base and the cost of redistribution.
The gain in tax base might outweigh the efficiency loss associated with the
tax externalities introduced by the source principle for one of the countries.
It is useful to note that a country that is a net capital exporter under the
residence principle might become a net capital importer under the source
principle. We can therefore not conclude from the fact that a country is
importing capital under the residence principle that it would enlarge its tax
base with a shift to the source principle.
3 The Global Planner
It is possible that the two countries would prefer different principles to reg-
ulate the taxation of international capital income. In such a situation it
is interesting to ask which principle would best serve international justice.
Moral assessment of institutions that affect both national and international
distribution is inherently difficult. One needs to answer both the question
of which principle of distributive justice should be applied and whether or
not the same principle should be applied to both national and international
distribution. Some moral philosophers have argued that principles of jus-
tice should only be applied at the national level, while others have argued
that a different, and less demanding, set of principles should be applied to
international distribution. Theories within what I described as the assign-
44
ment approach to international justice are typically cosmopolitan theories of
justice. These theories take all human beings, even distant strangers, to be
included in the scope of justice and argue that the same principles must be
used to assess both national and international income distribution. Utilitar-
ians, such as Peter Singer (1972) and Robert Goodin (1995), have argued
that the goal of redistributive policy should be to maximise the global wel-
fare. Similarly, some Rawlsian theorists, such as Charles Beitz (1979) and
Thomas Pogge (1989), have argued that the maximin criterion should be ap-
plied to issues of international justice as well as to national justice.f Below
we shall assume that the global planner would endorse a utilitarian principle
of justice, but most of the results would follow whenever the global planner
gives some weight both to national and international distribution. The im-
portant point is that most theories within the assignment approach would
maintain that there could be situations where national redistribution could
be sacrificed for the sake of international distribution.
We assume that the global planner wants to maximise the sum of utility
in the two countries, i.e. he puts equal weight on the welfare of all individuals
irrespective of where they live. The welfare function is then given by
(24)
If the global planner could determine the income of each individual she
would simply choose the first best utilitarian optimum
i.e. the income would be distributed equally among all individuals both
within each country and between countries. Capital would also be allocated
efficiently between countries so that the marginal productivity in capital is
equal in both countries. If the global planner could determine a lump-sum
transfer from the rich country to the poor, it could achieve the first best
allocation by using a residence principle. The source principle can only be
optimal in this model if a just international distribution cannot be secured
2John Rawls (1993) has objected to this interpretation of his theory and argued that
his maximin criterion applies only to domestic justice.
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through transfers from the rich to the poor country. In this paper we as-
sume that lump-sum transfers between countries are not possible and that
international income transfers are either impossible or prohibitively costly.
The justification for this assumption is partly that it seems to be difficult to
get political support for increased transfers to poor countries and partly that
such transfers tend to be less than successful in achieving their objectives.
Assuming that the only policy instrument available to the global planner
is the choice of tax principle in the bilateral tax treaties we might have
a trade-off between efficiency and national redistribution on the one hand
and international redistribution on the other. In order to determine which
distribution of tax rights would maximise the global welfare the social planner
would have to compare global welfare under the two different regimes
wR= (26)
where is tf the optimal tax for country i under the source principle.
Under the residence principle there is no national income inequality and
no inefficiency, but the distribution might involve considerable international
inequality. Under the source principle there is no international inequality
between capital owners, but there is inequality between both workers and
capital owners within each country and between workers in different coun-
tries. When the tax rates in the two countries are unequal there will also be
an inefficient allocation of capital under the source principle.
It is inherently difficult to compare different regimes without using specific
utility and production functions. We shall focus on the after-tax income of
the workers in the capital poor country, by assumption the individuals who
are worst off under the two regimes. If the objective of the global planner
was given by the maximin criterion this focus would be sufficient. With a
utilitarian objective function we have to weigh the potential benefit to the
worst off against possible losses to other groups. However, if we can show that
the source principle can increase the income of the worst off individuals we
know that the principle, for some utility functions, maximises global welfare.
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In order to find out when this is likely to be the case we need to study some
special cases.
i) Two identical countries
One interesting special case is the situation where the two countries are
identical, both with respect to factor endowments and technology. In this
situation the residence principle would always be preferable to the source
principle. Under the residence principle both countries distribute their in-
come equally between workers and capital owners and both countries have
the same national income so there will be neither national nor international
income inequality. The residence principle will, in other words, be sufficient
to secure a first-best global optimum. Due to the symmetry, there will not be
any international income inequality or any inefficient allocation of capital un-
der the source principle either. However, the source principle introduces tax
externalities between the countries that create inequality within each coun-
try. Noticing that K; = Ri and that ap/Bli = -1/2 when the two countries
are identical we can rewrite (23) as
(28)
In this case the tax rates in both countries are unambiguously too lowas
long as CKi > O (Hoyt 1991). The insight we derive from this special case is
that the optimality of the source principle must be a result of some asym-
metry between the two countries. Identical, or relatively similar, countries
always prefer a residence principle. This result could explain the predomi-
nance of the residence principle between the OECD countries.
ii) No capital endowments in the poor country
The difference in per capita capital endowments is one important type
of asymmetry between the two countries. In the extreme case where the
residents of the poor country have no capital endowments, i.e. when R2 =
O, the poor country will not have any tax base at all under the residence
principle. The welfare in the poor country, W2R, is then simply
(29)
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In this case the source principle must be as good as the residence principle
for the poor country. This can be seen by observing that by setting the tax
equal to zero, the poor country will be at least as well off under the source
principle as under the residence principle. As long as the tax rate in the
poor country is equal to, or lower than, the tax rate in the rich country
the poor country will be better off under the source principle. The welfare
gains associated with reduced international inequality would then have to be
weighted against the loss of welfare due to reduced national redistribution in
the rich country.
iii) A small and a large country
Another important source of asymmetry between countries lies in their
relative size. Differences in country size in the context of international tax
competition has been analysed by Bucovetsky and Wilson (Bucovetsky 1991
and Wilson 1991). These writers show that a sufficiently small country can
gain from tax competition under the source principle. Kanbur and Keen
(1993) also derive this result in the context of indirect taxes and show that
there might be cases where a small country gains from the possibility of tax
competition because it can undercut the large country. A similar mechanism
is at work in the model presented above and we want to focus on how this
might affect the global planners evaluation of the two tax principles. To see
this, it might be useful to study the special case where the poor region is small
in terms of capital demand so that &tj / &ti ~ O. The capital poor country
will be better off under the source principle if it can increase its revenues
by setting its tax equal to the tax in the capital rich country. However, it
might gain from setting a lower tax in order to attract a larger tax base.
If they can attract capital by lowering their tax rates without inducing a
similar reduction in the rich countries tax rates they might want to 'free
ride' on this possibility. Even if the poor country is capital exporting under
the residence principle, it might prefer a source principle because it might
benefit sufficiently from the opportunity to attract capital by lowering its tax
rates. The relative size of the two countries is also important for the effect
the source principle has on national redistribution in the rich country. If the
poor country is sufficiently small relative to the rich country, the effect on
national redistribution in the capital exporting country will be negligible. In
this case the source principle might maximise global welfare.
iv) Extremely inelastic capital demand
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When the demand for capital is very inelastic, the capital importing coun-
try prefers the source principle. In this situation the capital importing coun-
try will want to exploit its opportunity to export parts of the tax burden.
This is clearly seen in the extreme case where the amount of capital exported
from the rich to the poor country is independent of the tax rate in the poor
country, i.e. when åKi/åti ~ O. In this case the capital import will be in-
dependent of the tax level in the two countries and will thus be the same as
under the residence principle. The poor country gains because its tax base
increases. Furthermore, since there are no positive tax externalities, national
redistribution will not be more costly under the source principle than under
the residence principle.
These examples show that the question of whether or not it will be optimal
to base a bilateral tax treaty on the source principle rather than the residence
principle, depends on the degree of asymmetry between the two countries.
If the two countries are relatively similar with respect to per capita capital
endowment and production technology, such as is the case within the OECD
area, it would be optimal from the point of view of the global planner to use
the residence principle. However, if the countries differ in their per capita
capital endowment and in their technology it might be optimal to choose
the source principle. In particular it might be beneficial to apply the source
principle in bilateral tax treaties between a large capital exporting country
and a small capital importing country. The reason is partly that it gives
the capital poor country a larger tax base, and partly that it gives the small
country a chance to exploit international tax externalities to its benefit. At
the same time the effect on national redistribution in the rich country will be
limited. The net effect of a shift from the residence principle to the source
principle might therefore be an increase in global welfare. It is, however,
interesting to observe that the source principle does not necessarily reduce
the international inequality. In some cases, in particular, when it is invested
more capital per worker in the capital poor than in the capital rich country,
the source principle might increase international inequality compared with
the destination principle.
In the model above, we have assumed that the capital has to be invested
in one of the two countries. However, the main difference between the two
principles becomes even more distinct if we assume that both countries are
small. If both the countries were small compared with the world economy
they would have to take the international after tax return to capital as given,
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i.e. Bp/ati = O. In this situation, the countries would be unable to use the
capital tax to redistribute income between workers and capital owners. Any
tax imposed on the capital owners would be born by the workers. This
is a version of the result found in the literature on international taxation,
that source-based taxes should not be used when a country face a perfectly
elastic supply of capital (Frenkel et al. 1991; Bucovetsky and Wilson 1991).
If all countries set their tax rates equal to zero, the return to capital and
labour under the source principle will be the same as the pre-tax return
under the residence principle. If both countries have the same technology,
the pre-tax return to labour and capital will therefore be the same in both
countries and independent of the tax regime. The only difference between the
two principles is then their effect on national and international distribution
of income. Under the residence principle, there is intra-national equality,
but international inequality. Under the source principle, on the other hand,
there is no intra-national income equalisation, but international equality in
the sense that workers and capital owners have the same income irrespective
of where they live. The choice between the two principles thus becomes a
choice between two types of inequality. To see how the global planner would
make such a choice it is useful to assume that the populations in the two
countries are the same and that the total number of capital owners in the
two countries is equal to the total number of workers. We can then identify
the regime that maximises global welfare by comparing the difference between
the per capita net national product in the two countries and pre-tax return to
capital and the pre-tax wage under the residence principle. Global utility is
maximised under the source principle if the difference between the per capita
income in the two countries is larger than the difference between the return
to the two factors. If, on the other hand, the national inequality under the
source principle is larger than the international inequality under the residence
principle, then the global planner would prefer the residence principle.
4 A Residence Principle with a Withholding
Tax
It could be argued that the choice between the residence principle and the
source principle is a false choice because the residence principle could be
combined with a withholding tax levied by the source countries. Under the
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residence principle with a withholding tax the source country is allowed to
levy a fixed tax, 7, on the imported capital. 3 The withholding tax is fully
credited by the residence country and will thus not affect the allocation of
capital between the two countries. The difference between this regime and
the residence principle is effectively a lump-sum transfer of 7(K1 - Kl) from
the rich country to the poor country. The government revenue function is
then given by
(30)
We know that since each country is able to secure a first-best allocation
of its national income, all individuals within country i will have the same
. IRw· bmcome, i ,gIven Y
I!lW = Fi(Kr, Li) - (r - 7)(Kr - Ki)
t K,+ Li
From the perspective of the global planner a residence principle with a
withholding tax is preferable to a pure residence principle. If both countries
have the same technology it is possible to achieve the first-best globalopti-
mum for a given withholding tax. The withholding tax that achieves this, is
the one that equalises the per capital national income in both countries. Both
countries will then distribute their national income equally between workers
and capital owners. The resulting income distribution would be identical to
the first best global optimum described in section 3. This corresponds to
the result found by Janeba (1995). He studies the choice between the differ-
ent types of double taxation relief and shows that withholding taxes under
a residence principle could benefit both countries compared with the source
principle.
If the two countries do not have the same technology, large income in-
equalities between the two countries might persist even under a residence
principle with a withholding tax. This can be seen by noting that a with-
holding tax only increases the tax revenues of a poor country to the extent
(31)
3The assumption that the withholding tax is exogenously fixed circumvents the problem
of strategic withholding taxes. A discussion of these issues is given in Bond and Samuelson
(1989).
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that it imports capital. When the technology in the poor country is less pro-
ductive than the technology in the rich country, the capital import might be
limited even under a residence principle. If the source principle is preferable
to the residence principle in such a situation, e.g. because the poor country is
small and can attract capital by lowering its tax, it might also be preferable
to the residence principle with a withholding tax.
5 ConcludingRemarks
We have shown that the choice between the residence and the source principle
of international capital taxation is, at least partly, a choice between national
and international inequality and that there could be situations where the
global planner would choose the source principle rather than the residence
principle. If both countries have the same technology, residence taxation with
a withholding tax is preferable from the perspective of the global planner both
to the source principle and to the residence principle. If the technology is
not the same, there might be situations where the source principle is the best
way to alleviate international inequality.
A surprising feature of this finding is that it implies that a regime with tax
externalities might be preferable to a regime without tax externalities. Why
would the global planner want to introduce tax externalities? The reason is
that from the perspective of the global planner, consumption is 'inefficiently'
distributed between countries since the marginal utility of income is not the
same in both countries. The residence principle results in a first-best na-
tional optimum in each country, but the allocation is not a first-best global
optimum. If the externalities introduced by the source principle reduce inter-
national inequality it might be preferable to the residence principle, even if
the result is increased national inequality. The best way to regulate interna-
tional capital taxation could, therefore, be to apply the residence principle in
tax treaties between relatively rich countries, such as the OEeD-countries,
and apply the source principle in the tax treaties between these countries
and third world countries.
One could question the relevance of such an approach given the fact that
no such global planner exist or any institutions to enforce justice at the
international level. However, even if international justice is unenforceable
we might still be interested in knowing what it is. Furthermore, there is
some evidence that rich countries, to a limited extent, are motivated by
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considerations of international justice and are willing to take into account
the welfare of poorer countries.
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Chapter 4
Tax Treaties and the Marginal Cost of Funds"
Abstract
This paper analyses the marginal cost of public funds under dif-
ferent international tax regimeswhen the governmenthas a uniform,
broad-based value added tax as its only source of revenue and when
countries produce both tradeable and non-tradeable goods. Using
the concepts of direct and indirect tax externalities developed by
BevDahlby (1996) it distinguishesbetween national and international
marginal cost of funds and explores the effectsof bilateral tax treaties
that eliminate double taxation through the universal application of
either the destination principle or the origin principle.
1 Introduction
The value added tax accounts for a large and increasing share of government
revenues. The cost associated with raising revenues through such a tax is
therefore an important policy issue. Politicians and economists have been
worried that increased mobility of commodities and consumers might increase
the cost of financing public goods since an increase in the tax might shift
consumption away from the taxing country (Sinn 1990).
There is a large literature on commodity tax competition and on the
choice between the destination principle and the origin principle of commod-
ity taxation (e.g. Mintz and Tulkens 1986, Keen 1987, Kanbur and Keen
•A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 54th Congress of the Inter-
national Institute of Public Finance. I would like to thank Agnar Sandmo and Guttorm
Schjelderup for valuable comments. Financial support from the Norwegian Research Coun-
cil (the Ethics-program) is gratefullyacknowledged.
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1993, Lockwood 1993, Lockwood, de Meza and Myles 1994 and Keen and
Lahiri 1998). One result in this literature is that with perfect competition
and factor mobility, the destination principle secures an efficient provision
of public goods (Lockwood 1998). This paper contributes to this literature
by studying the choice between the destination and the origin principle in a
situation with non-tradeable goods. Non-tradeable goods are goods that can
be consumed by foreign residents in the country where they are produced,
e.g. hotel-, restaurant- and other services. It can also be interpreted as goods
that it is difficult or impossible for the importing country to levy taxes on,
e.g. cross-border shopping. The important feature of these goods is that
they allow the country of production to levy taxes on goods bought by for-
eign residents even under the destination principle. The paper shows that in
a situation with non-tradeable goods the destination principle will not gen-
erally secure an efficient provision of public goods and that the elimination
of double taxation by the introduction of either the destination principle or
the origin principle might not improve welfare.
2 Tax externalities and the marginal cost of
funds
Taxation in open economies introduces the possibility that the tax policy in
one country might affect the well-being of taxpayers in other countries. In
general, increased mobility makes tax jurisdictions become more interdepen-
dent and this interdependence gives rise to both negative and positive tax
externalities. Tax policy in one country might affect the welfare of other coun-
tries directly trough the prices faced by foreigners and indirectly through the
effect on foreign governments tax revenues (Dahlby 1996). In the same way
as traditional externalities introduce a gap between the private and the social
marginal cost of an activity, tax externalities introduce a gap between the
marginal cost of public funds (MCF) that is borne by the taxing country and
the marginal cost of funds that would be faced if the countries cooperated,
what we will call the international MCF. We shall identify the cooperative
solution as the one that would be chosen if the countries cooperated in max-
imising the sum of utility in the countries. A gap between the national and
the international MCF will result in either overprovision or underprovision
of public goods compared with the cooperative solution.
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Three phenomena widely discussed in the international tax literature; tax
exporting, tax competition and double taxation, can all be described as ways
in which national tax policies affect the welfare of consumers in other coun-
tries. Tax exporting, that the tax policy in one country affects the prices
faced by non-nationals, can be viewed as a direct tax externality in the sense
that it directly affects the indirect utility function of non-nationals and the
welfare effects of this are not taken into account by the taxing country. The
international trade literature has long recognized that taxation of traded
goods might result in a welfare-increasing change in terms of trade by in-
creasing the price of exported products relative to the prices of imported
products. Since tax exporting shifts some of the burden of taxation on to
non-residents it can be seen as a negative tax externality. It has therefore
been argued that tax exporting might induce overprovision of public goods
provision compared to cooperative solution (Wildasin 1987b).1
Tax competition and double taxation result in indirect tax externalities in
the sense that the tax policy in one country affects the tax revenues of other
governments and thus their ability to provide public goods. Whereas direct
tax externalities directly affect the prices faced by non-residents, indirect ex-
ternalities affect the welfare of non-residents indirectly through the budget
constraint of their governments. A positive indirect tax externality might be
seen to arise from the fact that tax bases are becoming increasingly mobile
between jurisdiction. Mobility generally makes it easier for tax bases to es-
cape taxation by moving to another jurisdiction. This might happen through
the migration of tax subjects or tax objects or through a shift in production
or sale from domestic firms or markets to foreign firms or markets. This situ-
ation is often referred to as tax competition since each jurisdiction will have
an incentive to lower its tax rate in order to attract mobile tax bases. Con-
versely, an increase in one country's tax rate will result in an increase in other
countries tax revenues: a positive indirect tax externality. The literature on
commodity tax competition was initiated by the seminal paper of Mintz and
Tulkens (1986). This and subsequent papers (e.g. Kanbur and Keen 1993
and Haufler 1996) show that with origin-based taxes countries have incen-
lThis result only holds, however, if tax exporting affects the marginal and not only
the average cost of funds. It has been shown that if the government choose an optimal
mix of tax instruments, tax exporting might under non-pathological conditions not affect
the MCF (Wildasin 1987a). In this paper we study the MCF in a situation where the
government is restricted to use a uniform VAT and in such situations this result does not
apply.
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tives to lower their taxes in order to increase their tax base. An increase in
a country's VAT causes consumers to purchase commodities that are taxed
by other jurisdictions if the goods in the two countries are substitutes (if the
goods are complements this will be a negative tax externality). It has been
shown that the existence of this positive tax externality between countries
might lead to underprovision of public goods and reduce the optimallevel of
redistribution. These results echoes the results from the literature on inter-
national capital tax competition (e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986, Wilson
1986).
An increase in a country's VAT might also result in negative indirect
tax externalities. This possibility arises in particular when jurisdictions have
overlapping tax bases, e.g. when both the exporting and the importing coun-
tries levies tax on traded goods. An increase in one country's tax will then
increase the price of the common tax base and, if the goods are normal goods,
reduce the tax base. The double taxation problem is essentially similar to the
double marginalization problem discussed by Spengler (1950). In Spengler's
model.the externality arises because the retailer does not take into account
the effect on the manufacturers profit when choosing prices. In the double
taxation story we do not have a vertical chain of monopolies but a situation
that could be described as two monopolies producing perfectly complemen-
tary goods. In the same way as the two producers could have increased their
profit by cooperating, it can be shown that double taxation might result in
the over-taxation of the common tax base, leaving the countries on the wrong
side of the Laffer-curve.
The distribution of tax base entitlements is closely related to the problems
of tax externalities. Double taxation arises because more than one jurisdic-
tion has the right to tax the same tax base. To avoid double taxation it is
necessary to determine a commonly agreed distribution of the right to tax
international tax bases. This is the primary task of the bilateral tax treaties.
Problems of tax competition arise because no jurisdiction has an uncondi-
tional right to tax certain tax bases. By defining tax rights in such a way as
to make it more costly to escape taxation by moving to another jurisdiction,
these problems can be reduced. The attraction of the destination principle
lies in the fact that people are less mobile than commodities. Similarly, tax
exporting might be seen as a result of the fact that countries sometimes are
able to shift part of the tax burden onto foreigners. Another attraction of the
destination principle is that it reduces the possibility of taxing the consump-
tion of foreigners. However, as we shall study in this paper, the destination
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principle does not eliminate this possibility when there exists non-tradeable
goods.
The three externalities discussed above introduce a wedge between the
national MCF and the international MCF. This paper compares the share
of the international marginal cost of taxation that is borne by the taxing
country before and after one of these of externalities, the negative externality
due to double taxation, is eliminated through a bilateral tax treaty that
establishes the universal application of either a destination principle or an
origin principle of international taxation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a two
country model of commodity taxation and develops a measure of the share
of the international marginal cost of taxation that is borne by the taxing
country. Section 3 studies the effect of establishing either a destination or
origin principle and thus eliminating the double taxation in a situation with-
out any non-tradeable goods. Section 4 studies that same questions in a
situation with non-tradeable goods and compare the results with those in
section 3. Section 5 concludes.
3 The Model
We study the effect of different international tax principles in a model with
two countries; country 1 and country 2. Each country sell one tradable good,
denoted Xl and X2 respectively, and one non-tradable good, denoted Yl and
Y2 respectively. These goods might be viewed as composite goods. Non-
tradeable goods can be bought by foreigners, but they have to be consumed
in the country where they are produced and the country where the foreign
consumers are citizens is therefore unable to tax these goods. Tradeable
goods can, in the absence of a tax treaty, be taxed by both the exporting and
the importing country. In each country there is a representative individual
(i.e. the population is normalized to one) and this individual is endowed with
one unit of leisure. The individual in country i has the utility function
(1)
where li and gi are the levels of leisure and public good consumed in
country i and Xi and yi are the consumption vectors of tradeable and non-
tradeable goods for the individual in the same country. There is no in-
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ternational incidence of public expenditure and the utility is, for analytical
convenience, assumed to be separable in public goods and private consump-
tion. We let leisure be the numeraire and the representative individual in
each country have a fixed full income, I, which is untaxed. There is perfect
labour mobility, but individuals cannot change citizenship.i Labour is the
only factor of production and the production technologies for all goods, in-
cluding the public good, are assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale.
Firms are assumed to be price takers and the producer price of all goods
are normalized to unity. There are no transportation costs. Let q; be the
consumer price of the tradeable good j in country i. FUrthermore, let Pi be
the consumer price of non-tradeable good j (which will be the same for all
consumers). The individualliving in country i maximizes her utility subject
to the constraint that
(2)
where qi is the tradeable goods price vector faced by consumers in country
i and P is the price vector of the non-traded goods. The price of the public
good is normalized to unity so the expenditure on public goods are equal to
gi. The indirect utility function of the representative individual of country i
can then be written as
(3)
From the solution to the consumer problem we can derive the demand
functions for the commodities as a function of the vector of tax rates and the
income.
3.1 The governments' problem
The government in country i is assumed to maximize the indirect utility, Vi, of
its representative individual subject to the requirement that its expenditures
on public goods, gi, does not exceed its tax revenues, Ri, i.e. that Ri 2: gi.
The governments are assumed to be restricted to use a general value added
2The assumption of perfect factor mobility is important in this context. Lockwood
(1998), shows that with perfect competition and factor immobility, the destination and
the origin principle are equivalent with uniform taxation.
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tax, ti, that is levied uniformly on the country's tax base, in financing the
provision of public goods. Since the VAT is a distortionary tax it might
cost more than one dollar to raise an extra dollar of tax revenue, i.e. the
marginal cost of funds might exceed one." In such a situation the classical
Samuelson formula for optimal provision of public goods, that assumes that
public expenditures are financed with lump-sum taxes, has to be modified
(Atkinson and Stern 1974, Ballard and Fullerton 1992). Samuelson measured
the marginal cost of a project by the marginal rate of transformation and in
order to introduce the distortionary effect of taxation it is therefore common
to multiply this revenue cost of public goods with the marginal cost of public
funds. The marginal cost of funds, or the cost of revenue, is commonly defined
as the change in consumer welfare divided by the change in government
revenue (e.g. Ballard and Fullerton 1992 and Wildasin 1987a).
In open economies it is useful to distinguish between what we have called
the national and the international marginal cost of funds. The national
marginal cost of funds, denoted MCFl, is the marginal welfare costs born
by the residents of the country that levies the tax, divided by the marginal
increase in tax revenues in the same country. This measure can be written
as
(4)
where )..i is the marginal utility of income in country i. The expression
in the numerator on the right hand side of (4) is a money-metric measure of
the change in consumer welfare from a marginal increase in ti in the country
that levies the tax. This measure is divided by the change in tax revenue in
the same country, R!i.
The international marginal cost of funds, denoted MCP, is given by con-
sidering the cooperative solution. We assume that the cooperative problem
is to choose the tax rates in the two countries so as to maximize W = v2 +v2
subject to the two countries' budget restrictions. Since we are not interested
in issues of international distribution we assume that the marginal utility of
3When distortionary taxes have to be used it is common to assume that the marginal
cost of funds is larger than one. However, there are cases where the MCF may be less
than one. Perhaps the best example of this possibility is environmental taxes (Pigouvian
taxes) since such taxes might reduce or eliminate, rather than create, distortions.
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income and the marginal utility of public goods consumption is the same in
both countries. The international marginal cost of funds associated with an
increase in the VAT in country i can then be written as
MCP = _V~i/>..i+ vf';>,,i
Ri. + R;.
where i =f j. This measure is the sum of the money-metric welfare cost in
both countries divided by the change in government revenue in both coun-
tries.
Non-cooperative national tax policies might result in either overprovision
or underprovision of public goods compared with the cooperative solution,
depending on whether MCFl is lower than or higher than MCFi. It is
therefore interesting to study the relationship between the national and the
international cost of funds under different international tax regimes. In order
to do this we analyse the relative share of the international marginal cost of
funds that is borne by the country levying the tax. This share, denoted by
(i, is given by
(5)
(6)
The non-cooperative provision of public goods will coincide with the c0-
operative solution when the national MCF is equal to the international MCF,
in other words when (i = 1. This condition can be rewritten as
(7)
where i =f j. The left hand side of (7) is the change in tax revenue in
the rest of the world for a marginal change in ti relative to the change in
tax revenue in country i. This can be seen as a measure of the indirect
tax externality and we denote this measure as ai = R:';R~. The right
hand side is the change in consumer welfare for non-residents relative to
the change in consumer welfare for residents in country i. This expression
can be seen as a measure of the direct tax externality and it is denoted by
(Ji = (vf';>..j)/(V~';>..i). The provision of public goods in the non-cooperative
63
situation will coincide with the cooperative solution when ai = ai. This
result can be given the following interpretation; if the share of the welfare
cost borne by foreigners are equal to the share of the gains that is received
by foreigners, these effects cancel out
Using the measure of the indirect and direct tax externality the expression
(5) can then be rewritten as
ri = MCF'/ = 1+ ai
MCFi 1+ ai (8)
Starting from a situation without any tax treaty we are interested in
studying how ai and ai are affected by the introduction of either the desti-
nation principle or the origin principle. Furthermore, we want to compare the
effect of introducing the destination principle and the origin principle in a sit-
uation without any non-tradeable goods and a situation with non-tradeable
goods.
4 All goods are tradeable
We start by analysing a situation where all goods are tradeable. Without
a tax treaty, the tax base of a country i is all goods that either have the
country as its origin or as its destination (or both). All producer prices are
normalized to one and an ad valorem tax is therefore equal to a specific tax.
Since it is easier to study a specific tax than an ad valorem tax this is a useful
simplification. The revenue function for country i can then be written as
(9)
where x, = x~+xi and i =i j. International transactions can be taxed by
both countries and part of the tax base, xi + x~, is therefore shared by the
two countries. The tradeable goods prices faced by the consumer in country
i are given by
i_l + ti f ar i = j
qj- l+ti+tj far i=ij
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where the superscript denotes the residency of the consumer and the
subscript denotes the origin of the product. By studying these prices we see
h t f '.4' h th t # di ~ 1 d ~ O An't a or 't r J we ave a Ttt = 7ftt = dti = an dti =. mcrease
in country i's VAT will increase the price of all goods produced in i and all
goods produced abroad, but consumed in country i. The price of other goods
will not be affected.
To find the measure of the indirect tax externality we observe that the
first derivative of the two countries revenue functions with respect to a change
in country i's tax rate are given by
(10)
Ri = (dx~ dx1 )ti
t» dt~ + dt'
We will in general assume that the tax rates are set optimally and that
~. > O, i.e. that country i is on the right side of the Laffer curve. R:.
captures two effects. The first is the effect an increase in ti has on the tax
base shared by the two countries, what we could call the double taxation
effect. Ifwe assume that all goods are normal goods we know that the own-
price effect creates a negative tax externality, i.e. that rt < Oand ~{}~< O.
q3 'li
Furthermore, we will assume that the own-price effect dominates the cross-
price effect which implies that ~ < Oand ~ < O. The second effect is the
cross-price effect on the part of the tax base that is taxed only by country
j. The sign of this effect will be either positive or negative depending on
wether the goods are substitutes or complements. The positive indirect tax
externality associated with commodity tax competition arise when the goods
produced in the two countries are substitutes, i.e. when ~ > O. The sign ofR:. is therefore indeterminate unless the goods are complements. Using (10)
and (11) we can write the measure of the indirect tax externality as
(11)
Ri (~+ ~)tii ti dt' dt'aT = -. = ----=""----'=---,-
~i (x + Xi) + (!S. + ~)tii i dti dti
(12)
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where the subscript T indicates that we are looking at the case with
only tradeable goods. The sign of o:~ will depend on the sign of R~i and
might therefore be positive or negative. When the goods are substitutes the
sign will depend on the relative strength of the tax competition effect and
the double taxation effect. The value of o:~ is likely to be higher for small
countries than for large countries, because small countries tend to be more
open and have a larger share of their production consumed by non-nationals.
Since country i is able to tax commodities that are consumed by non-
nationals there will be a negative direct tax externality. Using Roy's theorem
we find that the first derivative of the indirect utility functions in the two
countries with respect to ti and the change in consumer welfare in country j
relative to the change in country i are given by
(13)
d. = -Aj(:d) < Ot' t - (14)
(15)
The direct tax externality captured by (T~ is the tax exporting effect. We
note that (T~ is equal to the share of country i's tax base that is consumed by
foreign residents relative to the share that is consumed by its own nationals
(we can express (T~ this way because we have assumed that Aj = Ai). When
markets become more integrated, a larger share of a country's production
will typically be consumed by foreigners and (T~ will increase. In this paper
we have assumed that the countries are symmetrical, but it is easy to see that
small countries generally will have a higher (T~ than large countries because
they will export a larger share of their production. Using (12) and (15) we
have that the share of the international marginal cost of funds that is born
by the country levying the tax is
(16)
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In general we do not know whether this share will be above or below one.
We can therefore not say whether we get overprovision or underprovision
of public goods compared with the cooperative solution. However, if the
goods are complements we know that a~ < Oand since O"~ ;::: Owe have that
()~ < 1, i.e. that we get overprovision of public goods. More generally we
get overprovision when a~ < O"~ and underprovision when a~ > O"~. The
provision of public goods will in other words depend on the importance of
the tax competition effect relative to the tax exporting and double taxation
effect.
4.1 The destination principle
The most common way to eliminate double taxation is to employ the des-
tination principle. A country that employs the destination principle levies
the VAT on all goods and services destined for final consumption within its
territory regardless of the goods' origin. Hence, the destination-based VAT
is essentially a consumption tax. Therefore, exports are exempted, whereas
imports are taxed. The revenue function of country i is then given by
(17)
We observe that country i is not allowed to tax the traded goods produced
in its own country when they are consumed by the resident of country j.
Under this regime the resident of a country i is therefore faced with the
following set of prices
i_l + ti far i = j
qJ' - 1+ ti f ar i =I j
Fr th . h th t dq~ ~ 1 d ~ dqf O £ . u ;om ese prices we ave a dtt = dti = an dti = -;_ut = or ~ -r J.
An increase in country i's VAT will only affect the prices of goods consumed
by residents of country i.
With the destination principle the first derivative of the two countries
revenue functions with respect to a change in country i's tax rate and the
measure of the indirect tax externality are given by
i d i. . . dx· xj.
R;. = (x~+ xj) + (dt: + dti )t' (18)
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(19)
(20)
where the subscript D denotes that destination principle applies. We
observe that an increase in the VAT in country i has no effect on the revenues
in country j because there is neither an own-price nor a cross-price effect on
country j's tax base. Since R;i = Owe have that a~D = o. the indirect
tax externalities are in other words eliminated by the introduction of the
destination principle.
The most obvious effect of implementing the destination principle is that
it eliminates the possibility of taxing tradeable goods consumed by non-
residents. The first derivative of the indirect utility functions in the two
countries and the measure of the direct tax externality is therefore given by
(21)
(22)
(23)
As expected, the destination principle eliminates the problem of tax ex-
porting because country i only taxes goods consumed by its own residents.
Using (20) and (23) we have that the share of the international marginal cost
of funds that is born by country i simply is
ri = 1+ a~D = 1
TD 1+ (ji
TD
(24)
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i.e. the country that levies a VAT is faced with the full international MCF.
This reflects the result reported by Lockwood (1998) that with perfect factor
mobility, perfect competition, and destination based taxes, there are no tax
spillovers. Consequently, the provision of public goods in the non-cooperative
situation will coincide with the cooperative solution. We can therefore say
that a move from a situation without a tax treaty to a situation with the
destination principle will be welfare improving.
4.2 The origin principle
A country that applies the origin principle levies taxes on all goods and
services produced within its territory, irrespective of their final destination.
Therefore, exports are taxed, whereas imports are exempted. Hence, the
origin-based VAT is essentially a tax on GDP minus gross domestic invest-
ments. Country i's revenue function is therefore given by
(25)
Under this principle the representative individual in country i is faced
with the following system of prices
i 1+ ti f or i = j
% = 1+ tj for i =I- j
The derivatives of the prices with respect to ti are the same as under the
no-tax treaty regime except for the fact that ~ = O. Differentiating the two
countries' revenue functions with respect to a change in country i's tax rate
gives us the measure of the indirect tax externality
(26)
(27)
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Ri ~tii ti dt'
O'.TO = -. = x. + ~ti
~i t dt'
(28)
where the subscript O denotes the origin principle and where ~ =~ +~å~.
q, 'li
The sign of O'.~owill depend on the sign of R:i and we know that if the goods
are substitutes R~ > O and if they are complements R;i < o.
Again we can use Roy' s theorem to find the first derivative of the indirect
utility functions and the measure of the direct tax externality
(29)
(30)
i vfdAi xta -----TO - i.j,i - x~vt' A t (31)
The origin principle does not eliminate a country's ability to tax non-
residents and a~o is therefore positive. The representative individual in both
countries are assumed to have the same preferences and the same income.
Under the origin principle they also face the same prices. We thus have that
xt = x~and we know that a~o = 1. Using this the share of the international
marginal cost of funds born by country i can be written as
. 1 [ . ]
()~o = 2" 1+O'.~o
Whether or not we get overprovision or underprovision of public goods will
depend on the value of O'.~o. If the goods are complements, i.e. if O'.~o< O,
we get overprovision. If, on the other hand, the goods are sufficiently strong
substitutes, if O'.~o> 1, we get underprovision. It should be noted however,
that a~o > 1 is a very strong requirement since it implies that the increase in
(32)
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tax revenues in the foreign country is larger than the increase in tax revenues
in the countries that levies taxes.
In a situation without non-tradeable goods the destination principle should
be preferred to the origin principle if one wants to achieve the cooperative
solution. Furthermore, we do not know whether or not the origin principle
results in a more efficient allocation of resources than a situation without
any tax treaty.
5 With non-tradeablegoods
We now turn to the situation where each of the two countries produce one
non-tradeable good, Yl and Y2 respectively, in addition to the tradeable goods.
Non-tradeable goods are taxed in the country of production irrespective of
the tax regime. Without a tax treaty the tax base of country i is therefore all
non-tradeable goods originating within its territory and all tradeable goods
that has the country either as its origin or as its destination. The government
revenue function in country i in this case is given by
(33)
where i '=I j and Yi = YI+Y{ As in the case without non-tradeable goods,
part of the tax base, x1 + x~, is shared by the two countries. The tradeable
goods prices are the same as in the no-treaty regime above. However, the
consumers can now buy non-tradeable goods and the prices of these goods,
for consumers in both countries, are given by
Pi = 1+ ti
where" = 1 and 1¥ = O for i "# j. An increase in country i's VAT
will increase the price of all goods produced in i and all goods produced in
the other country, but consumed in country i. The price of other goods is
unaffected by an increase in ti.
The first derivative of the two countries' revenue functions and the mea-
sure of the indirect tax externality are given by
(34)
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Ri (dXi dx{ dyi) i- -+-+-tti - dti dti dti (35)
Ri (~ +~ + ~)tii ti dt' dt' dt'
o» = Ri. = ( i ) (dX. ~ !bli) i
v æ; +Xi + Yi + Ttt + dtt + dti t
(36)
where the subscript N indicates that we are considering the case with
non-tradeable goods. As before we cannot be sure whether an increase in
the VAT in country i increases or decreases the tax revenues in country
j. However, there is a new cross-price effect on the tax base in country j,
associated with the increase in Pi.
The first derivative of the indirect utility functions in the two countries
gives us the change in consumer welfare in country j relative to the change
in country i
(37)
(38)
ai _ Vfi j>.,i _ . x1 +. Y1 . > O
N - vi.l).,i - X~ + X~. + Y~ -
t' ~ J ~
An increase in ti affects the welfare of foreigners directly by increasing
the price of both tradeable and non-tradeable goods produced in country i.
When markets become more integrated, a larger share of each country's con-
sumption will typically be produced in foreign countries and akr will increase.
Using (36) and (39) we have that the share of the international marginal cost
of funds that is borne by country i is given by
(39)
ri - 1+ akr (40)
N - 1+ akr
As in the case without non-tradeable goods we cannot in general say
whether we will get overprovision or underprovision of public goods. How-
ever, if all consumption goods are complements we will get overprovision.
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5.1 The destination principle
ABin the situation without non-tradeable goods, the destination principle
will eliminate double taxation of tradeable goods by giving the country of
destination the exclusive right to tax. However, the destination principle does
not affect the right to tax non-tradeable goods. For i =1= j we therefore have
h ~ - ~ - !!& - d ~ - ~ - !!Ei. - O An i . trv s't at dti - dti - dti - l an dti - dti - dti -. Increase In coun ry ~s
VAT will thus increases the price of non-tradeable goods produced in i and
all tradeable goods consumed in country i. The government revenue function
in country i is given by
(41)
Taking the first derivative of the two countries revenue functions with
respect to a change in country i's tax rate we find the measure of the indirect
tax externality
i d i. .. dx· Xi dYi .
R~i= (x~+ xj + Yi) + (dt: + dti + dti W (42)
(43)
i (~ ~ ~) i
i Rti dt' + dti + dti t
aND = Ri. = (. . ) (dXi dxi. !Eli).
t' xi + xj + Yi + dif + it + dti t~
(44)
We observe that ah,D ~ O, i.e. all the indirect tax externalities are not
eliminated by the destination principle. The own-price effect on country j's
tax base is eliminated through the introduction of the tax treaty, but there
is still a cross-price effect on country j's tax base, (~ + ~ + ~), since
an increase in country i's VAT increases the prices foreigners have to pay for
non-tradeable goods produced in country i. The sign of ah,D will depend on
the sign of R:i•
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The first derivative of the indirect utility functions in the two countries
and the change in consumer welfare in country j relative to the change in
consumer welfare in country i are given by
(45)
(46)
(47)
The destination principle does not eliminate the problem of tax exporting,
because taxes on the non-tradeable goods partly is born by foreign consumers.
The measure of the direct tax externality, crkrD' is therefore always non-
negative. However, if the expenditure share on each commodity remains
fairly constant under the destination principle we have that crkrD ::; crkr, i.e.
that the tax treaty reduces the problem of tax exporting. Using (44) and
(47) we get the share of the international marginal cost of funds borne by
country i
ri = 1+ crkrD
ND 1+ aiND
While the destination principle secured an efficient allocation of resources
in a situation without non-tradeable goods this is no longer the case when we
have non-tradeable goods, i.e. riND S 1. In this case we still have both direct
and indirect tax externalities and the result might be either overprovision
or underprovision of public goods depending on whether crkrD S akrD. We
cannot even be sure whether or not ()~D S ()~,i.e. we do not know whether
the elimination of double taxation through the application of the destina-
tion principle will reduce the gap between the national and the international
marginal cost of funds.
(48)
5.2 The origin principle
With the origin principle all goods, including the non-tradeable goods, are
taxed in the country where they are produced. For i =f j we therefore have
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ht~-~-~-l d~-~-~-O Th tt a dti - dti - dti - an dti - dti - dti -. egovernmen revenue
function in country i is then
(49)
Taking the first derivative of the two countries revenue functions with
respect to a change in country i's tax rate gives us the measure of the indirect
tax externality
(50)
(51)
Ri (~+ »wi V dt' dt'
aNO = Ri = + + (~ + !EIi)titi Xi Yi dti dV
(52)
where the subscript O denote the origin principle. As in the case with
only tradeable goods, the sign of ahro will depend on whether the goods are
substitutes or complements. In general we cannot say whether or not the
indirect tax externality is reduced by the application of an origin principle.
The first derivative of the indirect utility functions in the two countries
and the measure of the direct tax externality is given by
(53)
(54)
i vfil>J X{ + y{
(JNO = vi.l)..i = X~ + Y~ > O
t' ~ ~
(55)
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As in the case without non-tradeable goods we know that since both
individuals have the same preferences, face identical prices and have the same
income, we have that x1 = x! and yl = y;. We therefore have that O"hro = 1.
The measure of the direct tax externality under the origin principle is thus
not affected by the introduction of non-tradeable goods. We also note that
O"hro );: O"hrD' i.e. the direct tax externality is larger under the origin principle
than under the destination principle. Using (52) and (55) we get the share
of the international marginal cost of funds borne by country i
. 1 [ . ]()'No ="2 1+ a'No
If the goods are complements we get overprovision and if the goods are
sufficiently strong substitutes (if ahro > 1) we get underprovision. In a
situation with non-tradeable goods we cannot in general be sure whether or
not the destination principle will result in a more efficient provision of public
goods than the origin principle, i.e. whether ()~o 5 ()~D. Furthermore,
we cannot say with certainty that the origin principle will improve resource
allocation compared with a situation without a tax treaty, i.e. whether ()~o 5
()~.
In order to derive more precise results we have to study specific utility
functions. To illustrate this we consider a situation with linear logarithmic
utility functions. It this case we know that the expenditure share on each
commodity will be constant and this makes it possible to derive explicit
expressions for the tax externalities under the different tax regimes. It is
easy to show that for a given set of taxes, the relationship between the
measures of the direct tax externality under different tax regimes, are given
by O"hro 2:: O"hr 2:: O"hrD 2:: O. Compared with the regime without any tax treaty
a larger share of the tax burden is exported under the source principle and
smaller share is exported under the destination principle. A special feature
of the case with linear logaritmic utility is that there is no tax competition
effect because the share of income used on each commodity is constant. Tax
treaties, both those applying the source principle and those applying the
destination principle, eliminate double taxation when preferences are linear
logarithmic. We therefore know that there will be no indirect tax externalities
when double taxation is eliminated, i.e. ahro = akD = O 2:: ak. This
implies that ()~ ~ ()~o ~ ()~D ~ 1. Under all the tax regimes we will get
overprovision of public goods, but the destination principle is the tax regime
(56)
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for which the share of the international MCF borne by the taxing country is
closest to 1.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied the marginal cost of funds associated with a uni-
form VAT under different international tax regimes with and without non-
tradeable goods. It has shown that the share of the international marginal
cost of funds borne by the taxing country will depend on the relative im-
portance of three different tax externalities and that this share might be
less than, equal to, or larger than one. The establishment of a tax treaty
eliminates the negative indirect tax externality associated with double tax-
ation. Without non-tradeable goods the destination principle, but not the
origin principle, eliminates all tax externalities and secures an efficient pro-
vision of public goods. This result no longer holds when we introduce non-
tradeable goods. Furthermore, with non-tradeable goods we cannot generally
say whether a regime with a tax treaty results in a better allocation of re-
sources between public and private goods than a regime without a tax treaty
and we cannot say whether the destination principle should be preferred to
the origin principle. The destination principle is, however, likely to result
both in less tax exporting and less tax competition, reducing both the nega-
tive direct tax externality and the positive indirect tax externality compared
to the origin principle.
In recent years the focus of the international tax literature has been on
the problem of tax competition. The results in this paper suggest that the
apparently increasing problem of positive tax externalities between jurisdic-
tions might be seen as a result of the bilateral tax treaties that eliminate
double taxation and thus remove a negative tax externality that tended to
counteract the positive externality arising from tax competition. As in other
situations with more than one externality, we cannot be certain that elimi-
nating one externality will improve the resource allocation.
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Chapter 5
Inequality, Segregation, and Redistribution *
Abstract
Mainstream economic theory predicts that countries with large
inequalities in pre-tax income distribution will tend to be more redis-
tributive than countries which are more equal in this respect. Em-
pirical studies, however, offer no strong support for this theoretical
prediction. In fact, a number of studies indicate that the opposite
may be true, namely that countries which are more equal in terms
of of pre-tax income distribution tend to be more redistributive than
less egalitarian societies. The present paper offers an explanation to
this puzzle. In a model of endogenous choice of location and endoge-
nous aversion against inequality, we demonstrate that large pre-tax
differencesin incomemay lead to a residential segregation of rich and
poor. Such segregationmay reduce the social attachment between the
groups in society, and reduce the willingnessof the rich to make trans-
fers to the poor. Conversely,societieswith small pre-tax differencesin
incomemay be characterized by larger transfers and a less segregated
population structure.
1 Introduction
A well known result from the optimal tax: literature is that the optimal tax:
rate is increasing in the degree of inequality, see Sandmo (1976). The larger
*This paper is co-authored with Kjetil Bjorvatn. We would like to thank Hans K.
Hvide, Thomas Pogge, Jørn Rattsø, Agnar Sandmo and Bertil Tungodden for valuable
comments. The usual disclaimer applies. Financial support from the Norwegian Research
Council (the OSlE-program and the Ethics-program) is gratefully acknowledged.
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is the pre-tax income inequality between rich and poor, the larger is the gap
in the pre-tax marginal utility of consumption between the two groups, and
hence the larger should the welfare gains of redistributing income towards
the poor be. li we believe that policies are guided by a welfare maximiz-
ing government, welfare economics predicts that larger inequality in pre-tax
income distribution will be accompanied by larger transfers to the poor.
A similar prediction can be derived from standard median voter models of
taxation, see for instance, Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981).
In a society with large pre-tax income inequalities, the decisive voter will
be poor relative to the average income. Assume that taxes are a positive
function of income and transfers are distributed, say, on an equal per capita
basis. In this case, the larger is the pre-tax income inequality in society, the
lower is the decisive voter's tax price for any given transfer level. We should
therefore expect to see more redistribution the larger is the pre-tax income
gap between rich and poor.
Empirical studies, however, offer no strong support of the predicted pos-
itive relation between pre-tax inequality and redistribution. For instance,
Perotti (1996: 172) in a survey of growth, income distribution and democ-
racy, concludes that "there is ... very little evidence of a negative association
between equality and fiscal variables in democracies." Even more surprising,
a number of studies indicate that countries characterized by a high degree of
pre-tax income equality in fact may be more redistributive than less egalitar-
ian societies. One example is Persson (1995), who finds a negative correlation
between government spending and the degree of pre-tax inequality. Another
example is Bassett, Burkett and Putterman (1999) who find evidence of a
negative relationship between inequality and transfers. Finally, Horstmann
and Scharf (1999) observe that increasing income inequality in the U.S. and
other developed countries has been accompanied by increased reliance on
private provision of public goods, which tends to be less redistributive than
public provision. In light of the prediction from both welfare economics and
median voter models on this subject, these empirical results are puzzling.
There are certainly a number ofreasons why pre-tax inequality may be as-
sociated with little redistribution. First, the causality may go the other way
around, namely that the tax level determines pre-tax income distribution. A
large share of de facto redistribution probably takes place through measures
which equalize people's productivity, most importantly through government
investments in health and education. Societies that, for some reason, vote
for a large public sector may therefore experience small differences in pre-tax
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income. Second, pre-tax inequality and redistribution may have a common
cause. If for instance a society has strong preferences for equality, this might
affect the wage bargaining process and therefore the pre-tax income distri-
bution, as well as the choice of tax policy.
Alternatively, policies of redistribution may not be guided by a welfare
maximizing government or the preferences of the less wealthy majority of the
population. If people are selfish, and political power is distributed accord-
ing to people's wallets, then there may well be less redistribution in more
inegalitarian societies. Two articles which seek to explain the "redistribu-
tion puzzle", roughly speaking, along these lines, are Persson (1997) and
Horstmann and Scharf (1999). Generally speaking, the argument offered in
these two contributions is as follows. Cooperation between rich and poor in
society entails some measure of redistribution. The rich dislike redistribu-
tion but cooperation generates some common benefit to both groups. From
the viewpoint of the rich, if the income gap is modest the common benefit
of cooperation dominates the cost of redistribution, and hence both groups
will agree on the cooperative solution. If the income gap is large, on the
other hand, the rich will oppose cooperation. Given that the rich group has
sufficient political influence, the result may be limited redistribution.
The present paper offers an alternative explanation to the redistribu-
tion puzzle. In a model of endogenous choice of location and endogenous
aversion against inequality, we demonstrate that large pre-tax differences in
income may lead to segregation of rich and poor in terms of residency. Such
segregation may reduce the social attachment between the groups in soci-
ety, and reduce the willingness of the rich to make transfers to the poor.
Conversely, societies with small pre-tax differences in income may be char-
acterized by larger transfers and a less segregated population structure. The
fundamental difference between our paper and the contributions by Persson
and Horstmann and Scharf, is that while in our model, people dislike inequal-
ity, in the latter two, rich people do not care about the income level of the
poor and can only be induced to give away money as a quid pro quo.
The present paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
and section 3 the results. Section 4 discusses policy implications, and section
5 concludes.
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2 Model
There are two types of people in the economy; rich (R) and poor (P). Let
the total number of people be given by:
(1)
where I) is the number of people of type j = R, P. The rich have a
higher pre-tax income than the poor, for instance due to a higher level of
human capital, and are also politically more influential, for instance because
the poor to a lesser extent use their right to vote. The pre-tax income levels
are exogenously given, denoted by vR and vP for rich and poor, respectively.
National income (1) is fixed and equal to unity; 1 = vRLR+vP LP = 1. Taxes
and transfers are lump sum and purely redistributive. Disposable income for
the two groups, denoted by wi, therefore also adds up to unity:
(2)
Per capita income w - (1/ L) therefore equals 1/2. The degree of inequal-
ity in disposable income can be measured as:
(3)
The inequality measure e is reduced as wP goes up, taking the value zero
for wR = wP = 1/2, i.e., full equality. Since we assign political power to the
rich, wP ~ wR always holds.
The are two regions in the model; West (W) and East (E). The two
regions can be interpreted as different parts of the same city, different cities,
urban and rural area, or different regions of a country. For some reason, such
as better climatic conditions or better public services, people generally prefer
to live in the West. The utility derived from living in the West for person
i of type j is a1 E (0,1), which is uniformly distributed within each group
of people. Due to for instance community zoning regulations, the cost of
living in the West is higher than in the East. For analytical convenience, let
this additional cost be exogenously given by p. This formulation generates
in the simplest possible way a positive link between income inequality and
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residential segregation. Living in the East as such creates neither extra utility
nor extra costs. The budget constraint of type j in the West can be written
as:
(4)
and in the East:
(5)
where c{ is the consumption of type j in region k. People value not only
consumption and living in the West. They also value equality, or, equiva-
lently, dislike inequality in society. Let the utility of an individual i of type
j living in the West be defined as:
(5)
and in the East as:
(7)
where the last term in these equations captures the disutility of inequality.
This term is the product of the inequality measure introduced in (3) and
f3if-, which measures the aversion against inequality experienced by a person
i living in region k. We shall assume that f3ik is larger the larger is the
number of poor people that live in one's home region. This is in accordance
with sociological and psychological research, which demonstrates that social
attachments are created between people who interact frequently and live close
to each other, see for instance Baumeister and Leary (1995). Assuming that
the aversion against inequality in region k is shared byeverybody in that
region, we define it as:
(8)
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where Lf is the number of poor people living in region k, and IL, an ex-
ogenous variable, determines the sensitivity of inequality aversion to changes
in Lf. Although not modelled explicitely, we shall assume that a person's
aversion against inequality in society is shaped during childhood. The reason
could be that a person becomes more sensitive to inequality if she is exposed
to poverty during these formative years and if she establishes social bonds
to poor people. The Lf -term in (8) should therefore be interpreted as the
number of poor people in the region in which one grew up. When a person
becomes an adult, this inequality aversion is fixed and remains unchanged
even if the number of poor in the neighbourhood is changed. Disutility of
inequality is then determined uniquely by the inequality measure E, which
denotes inequality in society as a whole, which is also unaffected by loca-
tional choice. Since only adult persons make decisions about where to live,
locational choices will therefore be unaffected by a person's aversion against
inequality and the level of inequality as such.'
2.1 Location
The location equilibrium can found by setting (6) equal to (7) for a fixed
aversion against inequality, i.e., f3iW = f3iE = (3i' Using (4) and (5), we can
then find:
. wiaj = ln(. )
wJ -p
where ai defines the share of group j that chooses to live in the East,
implying that the total number of type j people living in the East is:
(9)
Li (wi) = Liai = Li [ln( ~i )]
E wJ-p
and where a share (1 - ai) lives in the West, implying:
(10)
(11)
lThe alternative assumption would be that people internalize the fact that their own
well-being depends on who their neighbours are. Such a formulation would introduce
strategic interaction between people, and make the characterization of the location equi-
librium more complex.
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Naturally, it suffices to focus on either L~(wi) or L{v(wi): We choose
L{v(wi). This function is convex in wi, a fact which intuitively can be ex-
plained as follows: ABthe share of the population in the West goes up, those
remaining in the East care ever less about moving to the West, and there-
fore need increasingly higher after tax income in order to do so. For future
reference, we note that (10) and (11) can be expressed as:
.' . pe(U-L{v )/U
W (Ltv) = )..1 = (. i) / .e V-LW V_l (12)
This equation implicitly characterizes the equilibrium distribution of peo-
ple across regions, given the cost of living in the West and given the in-
come distribution in society. From (12) it can be shown that L{v is zero for
wi ~ epj(e - l), and positive for wi > epj(e - l), which can be interpreted
as a reservation wage, below which no-one of type j willlocate in the West.
2.2 Transfers
Transfers in the present model are voluntary gifts from the rich to the poor.
Note that redistribution takes place only on a centrallevel, i.e., not within
regions. The level of transfers is determined by the median voter, who by
assumption is rich. In practice, the median voter could be rich because rich
people to a greater extent than poor people exercise their right to vote, or
simply because there are more rich people than poor people in the economy.
Since taxes and transfers are lump sum, the rich median voter perfectly
controls the income distribution in the country. Alternatively, and perhaps
more realistically, we may assume that it is politically unfeasible for the rich
to tax the poor, so that the pre-tax income of the poor defines a minimum
after-tax income for this group.
Using (l), (2), (4), (5), and (8), we can derive the optimal transfers for a
rich person i living in region k from the first order conditions (aUi~j8wP) = O
in (6) and (7), which yields:
P( P . [( J.tL~ (l (i ( P) ) lw Lw) = Ow =mm l + J.tL~) LP) 1-p 2 - L ,0.5 (13)
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P(LP LP) - () . [( I-£(L
P
- L~) )( l) 5]w - w = E =mm 1+ I-£(LP_ L~) LP' O.
Equations (13) and (14) describe the optimal disposable income for a poor
person, as seen from the viewpoint of a rich voter living in, respectively, region
West and East. The upper bound of ()k is given by wP = 1/2, which defines
a perfectly equal distribution of disposable income in society. Increasing wP
beyond 1/2 would unambiguously reduce the utility of a rich person, since
her private consumption would go down and inequality go up.
The optimal transfers for a rich living in region k can be easily found as
(()k - vP). Ifwe allow the rich to tax the poor, this expression may of course
be negative. As seen from (13) and (14), a rich person living in region k will
vote for larger transfers i) the higher is the sensitivity of inequality aversion
to changen in Lf, i.e., the larger is 1-£; ii) the more poor people that live in her
region, i.e., the higher is Lf; iii) for a given number of Lf, the smaller is the
total population of poor (LP) (since the tax cost of financing a given transfer
then goes down), and; iv) in the case of (13), the lower is the cost of living in
the West (p) (since a higher p increases the marginal utility of consumption
for a rich person in the West, and therefore increases the marginal cost of
giving money to the poor).
The equilibrium tax policy is affected by the regional affiliation of the
median voter. As mentioned earlier, the decisive voter in the present model
is assumed to be rich. For simplicity, let all rich people vote and a number
"t < LR of the poor use their right to vote. Even if poor voters are in
minority, they can choose whether to vote with the rich in the East or the
West, and thereby in some cases determine the regional affiliation the rich
median voter. Since the poor voters prefer a higher transfer than the rich,
they will support the group of rich (i.e., Easteners or Westeners) that vote
for the higher transfers. Tax policy is therefore given by:
(14)
i) ()w if La, > L~ + ,P
()* = ii) ()w if ILa, - L~I < ,P, ()w > ()E (15)iii) ()E if ILa, - L~I < ,P, ()E > ()w
iv) ()E if L~ > La, + ,P
Case i) applies if the rich in the West have a simple majority, and case
iv) if the rich in the East have a simple majority. Case ii) or iii) applies if
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neither the rich in the West nor in the East have simple majority. In this
case, the poor have a decisive say, and will vote with the group of rich people
that prefers the higher transfer level. In case the two groups of voters, those
supporting higher transfers and those supporting lower transfers, are equally
large, i.e., IL~ - L~I = IP' we assume that the tax policy remains as it
is, that is, either Bw or BE. In other words, a majority vote is required to
change the existing tax policy.
Tax policy depends on the regional distribution of people, and the regional
distribution of people in turn depends on the distribution of disposable in-
come in society, as given by (10) and (11). Setting L~ = L~ + ,P and using
(1) and (12), the critical level of after-tax income of a rich person above
which the rich in the West have a simple majority, can be found as:
(16)
which, using (1) and (2), corresponds to a critical after-tax income of a
poor person, below which the rich in the West have a simple majority, i.e.,
below which case i) in (15) applies:
~P 1 - w~ (2 - LP)
Ww= LP
Similarly, setting L~ = L~ + ,P and using the same procedure as above,
the criticallevel of after-tax income of a rich person above which the rich in
the East have a simple majority, can be found as:
(17)
(18)
and the corresponding criticallevel of income for the poor, above which
the rich in the East have a simple majority, i.e., above case iv) in (15) applies:
(19)
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Note the following three features of (17) and (19). First, the level of wk
is decreasing in p. Intuitively, when the cost of living in the West goes up,
a larger group of rich chooses to live in the East for any transfer level. The
critical levels of wk therefore go down.
Second, if poor people do not vote (,·t = O)they never have a decisive say
in choice of tax policy, and hence w~= WW = e". For, ,P > O,w~ > WW,
and the gap between (17) and (19) increases as ,P goes up. A larger ,P
implies an increase in the political influence of poor people, which in turn
increases the interval wP E (WW, w~) for which the poor have a decisive say
in the country's tax policy.
Third, in the relevant range of wP, i.e., wP ~ 1/2, Wk is a positive
function of LP. The reason is that an increase in the number of poor people
automatically reduces the number of rich people, since the total number of
people in the economy is fixed. When the number of rich people goes down,
their disposable income for any level of wP goes up. The tax level must
therefore increase to induce a sufficient number of rich people to locate in
the East, such that the rich in the West lose their simple majority vote, and
the rich in the East gain the simple majority vote, i.e., Wk goes up.
3 Equilibrium
We present the outcome of the model using figures which represent different
scenarios. The first three scenarios focus on different levels of cost of living
in the West. Scenario 4 analyses a change in the number of poor voters.
Scenarios 5 and 6 address the issue of group size, the former with a larger
number of poor and the latter with a smaller number of poor relative to rich.
Scenario 7 combines voting and group size, considering the case when poor
people vote and their number is relatively large. Table 1 summarizes the
values of the most important exogenous variables in the scenarios.
Table 1. Scenarios
Scenarios
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
p 0.1 0.25 0.15 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.1
,P O O O 0.25 O O 0.6
LP 1 1 1 1 1.5 0.75 1.25
LR 1 1 1 1 0.5 1.25 0.75
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In the figures, the number of poor people living in the West is measured
on the horizontal axis, with the measure of the total number of poor people
in the economy defining the length of the axis. The disposa ble income of a
poor person is measured on the vertical axis. An equilibrium occurs at the
intersection(s) of the location function (12), given by the AP-curve, and the
relevant level of transfers, as given by (15).
The relevant interval of a transfer curve (}k is marked with a bold pen,
while the irrelevant part is drawn as a dashed line. The relevant transfer
curve for the part of the AP-curve lying below the WW-line,is (}w, since the
rich in the West in this case have a simple majority. Similarly, for the part
of the AP -curve lying above the w~-line, (}E is the relevant transfer curve.
For wP E (WW, w~), the poor have a decisive say, and the tax policy is
determined by arg max ((}w, (}E)'
An equilibrium analysis is certainly interesting per se. However, to shed
light on the redistribution puzzle motivating this paper, we need to use the
static model developed here to tell a dynamic story. We have argued earlier
in the paper that the aversion against inequality is fixed at adult age, and
that changes in tax policy take place as new generations enter the voting
scene, and old generations exit. Changes in tax policy can therefore be
expected to be a slow process. The movement of people is likely to be more
flexible. Assume therefore that the economy is always on the AP-curve, and
that wP > O for (}* > -o", wP < Ofor (}* < wP, and wP = Ofor (}* = wP,
where w denotes change in disposable income over time.
The dynamics of redistribution can be interpreted in the following way.
The locational choice of parents determines the environment in which their
children grow up. If children grow up in a different environment (in terms of
the number of poor people in the neighbourhood) than their parents, they
will develop a different aversion against inequality. Consequently, when these
children reach adult age, their vote on tax policy will differ from that of their
parents. As long as the distribution of people across regions changes, the
inequality aversion in the population as a whole will change. This process
continues, until an equilibrium is reached, where the environment is stable
over time, involving a stable tax policy and a stable regional distribution of
people.
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3.1 Scenario 1: "Low"costs of living in the West
As is evident from Table 1, the first three scenarios focus on the cost of
living in the West. We assume here that poor people do not vote, which,
as discussed earlier, implies w~ = w~ _ wp. First, assume that the cost of
living in the West is "low"; p = O.l. Since living in the West is relatively
inexpensive, and since poor people do not vote, in this scenario it is always
true that wP < wP (not illustrated in the figure), and so case i) in equation
(15) applies. Since in this case the BE-curve,which illustrates the equilibrium
transfer levels given that the median voter lives in the East, is never relevant,
it is dashed in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: The" low cost" scenario
There are three equilibria in scenario 1; a, b, and c. Points a and c are
stable equilibria, b is unstable. To see why b is unstable, consider a small
movement away from b, sayan increase in wP, with L~ constant. At this
higher income, more poor people will choose to locate in the West. The
new location equilibrium can be found on the AP-curve corresponding to the
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higher level of ui", This point, however, lies below the Ow-curve, implying
that at this higher level of LW, the rich wish to offer the poor an even higher
income. This in turn stimulates further relocation of poor people into the
West, and hence a movement further away from b, in the direction north-east.
Similarly, a small reduction in wP, with b as point of departure, leads the
economy away from b, in the direction south-west.
Equilibrium a is a corner solution, characterized by a highly unequal
distribution of after tax income and a highly segregated population structure.
ITwe do not allow the rich to tax the poor, this corner solution would be given
by wP = vP ~ 0, LW(vP) ~ 0, which exists if vP < wP(b), where wP(b) is
the disposable income of the poor associated with equilibrium b. Equilibrium
c is an interior solution, characterized by a highly equal distribution of after
tax income and population structure.F
The model thus illustrates how two structurally similar countries may
end up in two radically different situations, with respect to redistribution
and segregation, depending on which of the two equilibria the economy co-
ordinates on. How may the model shed light on the distribution puzzle? To
answer this question, consider two countries, 1 and 2. The two countries
are identical in all respects, except that country 1 has a more equal pre- tax
income distribution; vPl > vP2, where superscripts 1 and 2 indicate the two
countries. Assume that transfers in country 2 are not sufficiently high to
compensate its poor population for its lower pre-tax income: Pre-tax income
differences in income are therefore reflected also in post-tax differences in in-
come, and so wPl > wP2. We can interpret the initial condition as describing
a situation before the establishment of the welfare state, when the means of
redistributing income were not fully developed. Alternatively, we can think
of the difference in pre-tax income distribution as being caused by a shock
in one or both of the economies, a shock which has yet to be compensated
fully by redistributive policies.
Assume that the difference is such that wPl > wP (b) > wP2, and therefore
a pattern of residency L{J > LW(b) > L{i. Since 0* > wP\ then wPl > 0,
and since 0* < wP2, then 'lif2 < O. In words, country 1, the more egalitarian
society, will over time move along the ),P-curve to equilibrium c, where there
is a lot of income redistribution taking place, and country 2, the less egal-
2It can be shown that a reduction in p, by increasing the disposable income of the
rich and therefore their willingness to transfer money to the poor, moves the egalitarian
equilibrium c north-east in the diagram, Le., towards greater equality.
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itarian society, will move to a corner solution, equilibrium a, with zero, or
even negative redistribution to the poor. This dynamic interpretation of the
model therefore predicts that societies which are more egalitarian in terms of
pre-tax income distribution, over time may become more redistributive than
less egalitarian societies. Redistribution may in this way increase, rather
than reduce, differences in income distribution between countries.
3.2 Scenario 2: "High" costs of living in the West
In Scenario 1 we assumed that the cost of living in the West was sufficiently
low to ensure that the median voter was always located in the West. As can
be seen from (16) to (19), however, for p> 0.2, wP < 0.5. Figure 2 replicates
Figure 1in all respects except one; the cost of living in the West is increased
to p = 0.25.
The higher costs of living in the West extends the range of wP for which
no poor people live in the West. Naturally, it also makes it more expensive
for rich people to live there, which explains why the wP -line has shifted
downwards relative to scenario 1 (where the wP -line was beyond the relevant
range of wP and therefore not included in the figure). A higher p also results
in a flatter Ow-curve. This is because a higher cost of living in the West
reduces the disposable income of rich people living there. For any given
number of poor people in the West, the drop in the disposable income of this
group of rich reduces their willingness to transfer money to the poor.
The single value of AP for which Ow applies, is AP = O. All positive
values of AP lie above the wP-line, and for these values, OE is the relevant
transfer curve. In this scenario, too, there are three equilibria. As before,
there is an "inequality" corner solution, equilibrium a, where the median
voter lives in the West, surrounded only by fellow rich people. If the pre-tax
income of the poor defines a minimum level of income from this group, the
"inequality" equilibrium will be given by wP = vP :2: o. Second, there is
a highly redistributive, interior solution c where the median voter lives in
the East. The cutoff level of wP below which case i) in (15) applies, and
above which case iv) applies, is given by wP = wp. At this point, there is an
equal number of votes for the two tax policies Ow and OE, and the existing
tax policy survives. Hence, as opposed to Scenario 1, point b here is not an
equilibrium.
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Figure 2: The "high cost" scenario
3.3 Scenario 3: "Intermediate costs" of living in the
West
In the present scenario, we maintain the assumptions made above, except
that the cost of living in the West is "intermediate", namely p = 0.15. As
is evident from Figure 3, in this case there is a unique equilibrium, the
maximum inequality one at a.
The fact that in the present case there is a unique equilibrium is interest-
ing, since both the "low cost" and the "high cost" scenarios described above
were characterized by multiple equilibria. In the "low cost" scenario 1 the
egalitarian equilibrium c was supported by the fact that redistribution to the
poor would spur a large number of poor people to move to the region of the
rich median voter, in this case the West. Having an increasing number of
poor people nearby, the aversion against inequality experienced by the deci-
sive voter will be strengthened, inducing her to vote for increasing transfers
to the poor.
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Figure 3: The" intermediate cost" scenario
In the "high cost" scenario 2, the egalitarian equilibrium c was supported
by a slightly different mechanism. Redistribution to the poor would spur a
large number of rich people to move to the region where the largest number
of poor people live, that is the East. With the extent of redistribution being
sufficiently large, the majority of rich would then be located in the East,
which would uphold the highly redistributive regime.
Intuitively, in the present scenario, higher costs of living in the West
relative to Scenario 1 makes it less likely that a large number of poor people
will join the majority of rich people living in the West. Hence, the forces
supporting the egalitarian equilibrium in Scenario 1 are weakened. At the
same time, lower costs of living in the West than in Scenario 2, implies that
the forces upholding the egalitarian equilibrium in the "high cost" case are
also weakened: Redistribution will not induce a large number of rich people
to join the poor majority in the East. The result is a situation where social
segregation and income inequality is a necessary outcome.
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3.4 Scenario 4: When poor people vote
So far we have assumed that poor people do not vote. Even if the poor
voters are in a minority, they will affect whether the median voter is a rich
person in the East or in the West. Poor voters will support the group of
rich, Easteners or Westeners, that vote for the higher transfer leveL Figure 4
below replicates Figure 2, i.e., the "high cost" scenario, in all respects except
that half of the poor population votes, i.e. "fP = 0.25. With poor people
voting, wf{, =f. wf, and in the interval wP E (wf{" wf), the poor may form a
majority coalition with the rich in the West or the East. Since ()E > ()w in
the relevant range of AP, the vote of the poor will go in favor of ()E.
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Figure 4: When poor people vote
There are two things to note about Figure 4 relative to Figure 2. First,
in Figure 4 the poor have a decisive say in determining the tax policy in
the egalitarian equilibrium ei together with the rich in the East, they form a
majority coalition voting for ()E. Second, and perhaps more substantial, w{{,
in Figure 4 is lower than in Figure 2. Intuitively, since the poor will vote
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with the rich in the East, a smaller number of rich in the East is necessary
in order to secure a majority for (}E. Hence, for a fairly low level of taxes,
implying a fairly low wP, the number of rich people located in the East will
be such that the majority vote is in favor of (}E. Interpreted in a dynamic
perspective, the model therefore gives the plausible prediction that societies
in which poor people to a larger extent use their right to vote, are more
likely to be redistributive than societies in which poor people to a lesser
extent exercise this right.
Note that if the number of poor voters is sufficiently large, the egalitarian
equilibrium c will be the only surviving one in this scenario. From (17) it can
be shown that for "IP > 0.42 => w{;, < O,which means that the poor always
have a decisive vote in determining tax policy. Clearly, their vote will be in
favor of (}E' Irrespective of the starting point, then, the economy will over
time move to the egalitarian solution.
3.5 Scenario 5: A larger group of poor
In the present scenario, we modify Scenario 2 by increasing the number of
poor relative to rich in society. Keeping the total population constant, let
LP = l.S, and LR = 0.5. We are therefore considering a society with a
smaller rich class and a larger class of poor people than before.
The most important thing to note with the present scenario, is that with a
larger group of poor relative to rich, the egalitarian equilibrium c disappears.
The only stable equilibrium here is the inegalitarian solution a. The are
two reason for this change relative to Scenario 2. First, as discussed earlier,
for any level of wP, a smaller group of rich is also a richer group of rich,
and therefore to a greater extent cluster in the West. This is captured by
the increase in the wP-line relative to Scenario 2. Second, a larger poor
population also means that the tax price of achieving any given level of
wP goes up. The willingness to pay taxes therefore goes down, which is
reflected in the flatter (}k-curvesrelative to Scenario 2. These two reasons in
combination result in the elimination of equilibrium c.
3.6 Scenario 6: A smaller group of poor
The present scenario reduces the number of poor people relative to Scenario
2; LP = 0.75, and LR = 1.25. Qualitatively speaking, the situation is as in
Scenario 2; there are two stable equilibria, a and c. The corner solution a is
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Figure 5: A larger group of poor
naturally unaffected by group size. The egalitarian solution c is even more
egalitarian than in Scenario 2, since both the AP -curve and the BE-curve are
steeper. Note also that wP is lower, the mechanisms behind this shift being
described in the previous Scenario. In a dynamic context, this means that
for a wider range of pre-tax income inequality, the economy will move in the
direction of the egalitarian solution.
3.7 Scenario 7: Poor voters, and large poor group
In this scenario, we return to the case where the cost of living in the West
is low, i.e., Scenario 1, but change two things. First, the group of poor is
larger; Lp = 1.25 and LR = 0.75. Second, we assume that a number of poor
people, ,..t = 0.6, use their right to vote.
Compared to scenario 1, the most important effect of these modifications
is that w~ has gone down." This is true even though the number of poor
3In the present scenario, Wk > 0.5 and is therefore not included in Figure 7.
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Figure 6: A smaller group of poor
people has increased relative to Scenario 1, which from earlier discussion we
know tends to increase w~. This effect is however dominated by the fact
that a number of poor people vote, which reduces the level of w~.
As in scenario 1, there are two stable equilibria; the low-redistribution
equilibrium a and the high redistribution equilibrium c. The most interesting
feature of the present scenario is that the poor minority shifts its allegiance
on the path from point b to point c. To see this, note first that, as before,
the rich in the West determine the tax policy below the w~-line. Above this
line, however, poor voters have a decisive say. They will lend their support to
the group of rich voting for the higher transfers. Moving along the >t-curve,
we see that BE wins the majority vote between point band d, the latter
indicating the point at which the BE-curve and the Bw-curve intersect. To
the right of point d, Bw wins the vote. Clearly, since the ).,P -curve intersects
the transfer curves to the right of point d, poor people in the egalitarian
equilibrium support the rich in the West.
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4 Policy implications
While redistributive policies are assumed to be determined by majority vote,
there may be other policies which, to a larger degree at least, are at the
discretion of the government. It may therefore be relevant to consider which
policy implications we can derive from the model. In a situation of multi-
ple equilibria, given that a country is at, or heading towards, the inequality
equilibrium a, and given that the government wishes to achieve a more equal
distribution of income, three policy measures may be employed. First, the
government may introduce policies which reduce the gap in pre-tax incomes
between the two groups, for instance in the form of education policies aimed
at improving the productivity of the poor, or perhaps by encouraging cen-
tral wage bargaining. Assume that vP defines a disposable income floor for
the poor. If the government mangages to increase vP to a level such that
wP> wP(b), the forces oflocation and voluntary redistribution will over time
move the economy towards the desired equilibrium c. Once the economy has
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reached c, there are strong forces that keep it there. The economy is therefore
no longer dependent on policies which equalize pre-tax income levels in order
to uphold this situation. Note however that if there is an absolute floor of
disposable income of the poor, such as zero, an increase in vP may be offset
by a similar increase in the taxation of the poor, making such a policy futile.
Second, the government could attempt to integrate more poor people with
the majority of rich. In Scenario 1, this may be achieved by a (temporary)
subsidy of housing for the poor in the West, and in Scenario 2 by a similar
subsidy in the East. Third, as we have seen in Scenario 4, encouraging more
poor people to vote may change the direction in which the economy is moving,
towards c. Indeed, if a sufficient number of poor people vote, the egalitarian
outcome is a unique equilibrium.
5 Conclusion
The optimal tax literature and median voter models predict that countries
with more inequality in pre-tax income distribution will redistribute more
than countries which are more egalitarian in this respect. Empirical research,
however, lends little support to this prediction. In fact, some empirical stud-
ies indicate that the reverse may be true, namely that more egalitarian soci-
eties, in pre-tax terms, redistribute more than less egalitarian societies. The
present paper offers an explanation to why this might be the case.
We argue that income inequality may lead to social segregation between
rich and poor in society. In the model, income inequality tends to geo-
graphically separate rich from poor. Segregation may weaken the feeling of
solidarity of the rich for the poor, and therefore reduce their willingness to
vote for redistribution of income. In such an economy, multiple equilibria
may exist; one equilibrium characterized by a large degree of geographical
segregation between rich and poor, and where redistribution is low (or even
negative), and another equilibrium characterized by a more equal distribu-
tion of after tax income and where rich and poor are geographically more
integrated.
Depending on the starting point, which we may interpret as a pre-welfare
state of the world, two economies may be pulled in different directions. An
economy starting out with a pre-tax distribution of income which is slightly
more unequal than a critical level, may be pulled towards the equilibrium
characterized by a high degree of segregation between rich and poor, and
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where redistribution is very limited, whereas an economy starting out with
a slightly more equal pre-tax income distribution, may move in the opposite
direction, involving more integration of groups in society and a more equal
distribution of disposable income. Hence, the modeloffers an explanation
to why there may exist a positive correlation between pre-tax equality and
redistribution.
Our model also demonstrates that regional differences in the cost of living
affect the model in rather interesting ways. Multiple equilibria exist when the
costs of living in the more "prestigious" region, the West, are either "high"
or "low". For "intermediate" costs of living in this region, however, only
the equilibrium characterized by inequality and segregation survives. The
propensity of poor people to vote also matters. An increase in the number
of poor voters makes the existence of an egalitarian equilibrium more likely,
and increases the likelihood that the economy will settle on this equilibrium.
When group size is considered, we find that the larger is the group of rich
relative to that of the poor, the more likely it is that the outcome will be
of the egalitarian kind. A similar conclusion is reached when analyzing an
increase in the number of poor voters.
Let us conclude by offering some suggestions for future research. First,
the present model only considers central redistribution. Opening up for local
redistribution would place the model closer to the fiscal federalism literature,
allowing us to analyze issues such as tax competition between regions, and
the relation between local and central redistribution. Second, for analytical
simplicity, we have chosen to keep the cost of living exogenous in this model.
Obviously, endogenizing the market for housing in the two regions would
add to the realism of the model, but equally obvious, such an extension
involves increased analytical complexity. Finally, the issue of dynamics could
be explicitly addressed by analyzing the evolution of altruism and locational
choice in, say, an overlapping generations modeL
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Chapter 6
Redistribution and the Size of Jurisdictions *
Abstract
This paper analyses the relationship between the size of jurisdic-
tions and the degree of redistribution. A simple political economy
model with cross-border shopping and limited and impure altruism is
developed in order to study how the size of jurisdictions affects both
the cost of redistribution and the political objectives of such policies.
An increase in the sizeof jurisdictions is shownto decrease the degree
of tax competition, but it also reduces the weight given to minority
interests by the majority. The number of jurisdictions that maximizes
global welfare is givenby a trade-off between these two forces.
1 Introduction
Questions about enlargement or separation of political and economic units
are at the core of the political debate in many countries and regions. One
issue that should be considered in this context is how a change in the size of
jurisdictions might affect redistributive policies and the income distribution.'
Economic theory suggests that enlargement of political units would in-
crease the degree of redistribution. An important, and robust, result in the
•A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 14th Annual Congress of the
European Economic Association. I would like to thank Kjetil Bjorvatn, Agnar Sandmo
and Guttorm Schjelderup for valuable comments. Financial support from the Norwegian
Research Council (the Ethics-program) is gratefully acknowledged.
lThe term jurisdictions will in this paper refer to countries or to states within a feder-
ation that have responsibility for redistribution within their territory. In the text we will
use the terms country and jurisdiction interchangeably.
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fiscal federalism literature is that redistribution at the state level creates
interjurisdictional tax externalities and inefficient resource allocation. An
implication is therefore that redistribution should be organised as central-
ized as possible (e.g. Musgrave 1959, Oates 1972 and Dixit and Londegan
1998).2 Similarly, the literature on international taxation has shown how
interjurisdictional tax externalities and tax competition might result in a too
low level of redistribution and that tax competition could be reduced if all
countries cooperated (e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986, Wilson 1986, Sinn
1990). This literature also implies that the cost of redistribution could be
higher with many small jurisdictions than with few big jurisdiction. For ex-
ample cross-border trade would be a bigger problem with small jurisdictions
because a larger part of the population would live closer to the border." If
these theories are correct, we would expect that centralization of fiscal policy,
or unification of sovereign countries, would result in increased redistribution.
Arguments for why decisions should be decentralized, and why the size
of jurisdictions should be limited have a long history. Plato argued that the
number of individuals in a city-state should be exactly 5040 (Plato 1994,
737e). His argument was mainly based on the requirements of direct democ-
racy. Economists have focused on the provision of public goods in discussing
the optimal size of jurisdictions. A recent article by Alesina and Spolaore
(1997) analyses the trade-off between economies of scale in public goods pro-
vision and heterogeneity of preferences in determining the optimal size and
number of countries. They argue that larger jurisdictions might reduce the
per capita cost of some publicly provided goods, but that they also increase
the heterogeneity of preferences in the population. Ellingsen (1998) develops
a related model, but focuses on the inter-regional externalities in the provi-
sion of public goods. Integration solves this problem, but Ellingsen argues
that a centralized government entails other cost associated with a neglect
of minority interests. Again it is inter-regional heterogeneity of preferences
that makes the case for decentralization. The model developed in the present
2An exception is Pauly (1973) who points out that if redistribution is viewed as a
spatially limited social good, decentralization might serve to accommodate different tastes
regarding income equality. The present paper attempts to show that decentralization
might be desirable even when inequality aversion does not differ between jurisdictions.
31n a world with both small and large countries the relationship between the size of
jurisdictions and redistribution becomes more complex, Kanbur and Keen (1993) have
shown that small countries in some cases might have lower taxes and a higher provision
of public goods than large countries.
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paper is related to the papers by Alesina and Spolaore and Ellingsen in its
focus on the trade-off between inter-jurisdictional externalities and minority
interests, however, both the nature of the externalities and the mechanism
underlying the neglect of minority interests are different. In particular this
paper studies a pure redistribution problem without any public goods, and
heterogeneity of preferences play no part in the argument.
In stark contrast to the recommendations of the fiscal federalism litera-
ture, considerable redistribution takes place at state and local level (Ladd
and Doolittle 1982). This paper claims that a more realistic characterization
of peoples motivation to help and the nature of altruism might explain this
apparent paradox. In particular we shall argue that the size of jurisdictions
affects the feeling of solidarity between their members and thus the outcome
of the political process. There could be several reasons why the governments
in small countries would take more account of minority interests. In this
paper we focus on how two features of social psychology; limited altruism
and impure altruism, might explain why the median voter is less motivated
to take into account the interest of a minority in large jurisdictions. Several
studies in social psychology suggest that people are limited altruists in the
sense that our ability to care about other people is limited. People tend
to establish bonds to, identify with, and care about, a restricted number of
people (see Baumeister and Leary 1995 for an overview). What the deter-
minants of our compassion are is obviously a very complex issue. However
our loyalties are not accidental. Our loyalties towards others, and our will-
ingness to help them, are typically the result of some type of interaction. In
particular, frequent contact and proximity seem to be important factors in
creating social attachments (Baumeister and Leary 1995).
The economics literature has discussed a phenomenon called impure altru-
ism or the warm gloweffect (Becker 1974, Andreoni 1989, Harbaugh 1998).
This effect refers to the fact that people's willingness to help, at least partly,
is motivated by the pleasure, or warm glow feeling, that the act of helping
gives and not by an interest in the welfare of others as such. If people are
motivated solely by the warm glow feeling, they only derive utility from the
welfare of other people to the extent that they contribute to it. The warm
gloweffect could be interpreted as capturing the intuitive idea that it is less
costly to help people we care about, because we derive utility from the fact
that our contributions benefit these people.
In this paper we will assume that people's altruism is both limited and
Impure. In other words, we assume that the warm gloweffect is associated
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with helping people we identify with and care about. In this case there is a
reason to believe that the motivation to help others might be decreasing in
the size of the jurisdiction. As a jurisdiction becomes larger, a smaller share
of a person's net contribution to the tax system benefits, or harms, those one
cares about. The warm glow motivation to take account of minority interests
is therefore decreasing in the size of jurisdiction. Neither limited altruism
nor impure altruism alone is sufficient to establish this negative relationship
between the size of jurisdictions and the willingness to help minorities. Ifwe
derived a warm glow feeling from helping anybody, it would not matter for
our motivation who we helped. Similarly, if we were limited, but not impure,
altruists, we would derive utility simply from the welfare of those we cared
about and it would not matter whether we or someone else helped them.
To see why the nature of altruism is important for redistributive policy
it is useful to note that such policies typically are determined through demo-
cratic procedures. In a representative democracy redistributive policies that
secure the welfare of minorities require the voluntary support of a majority
of its citizens. Obtaining such support is only possible if there exists a feel-
ing of identification on the part of the citizens and strong alliances between
them. Many western societies are characterized by a relatively affluent ma-
jority and a marginalized minority of unemployed, unskilled, disabled or old.
Transfers from the rich majority to the poor minority will typically depend
on the majority's feeling of solidarity with, and responsibility for, the minor-
ity. One particular danger therefore lies in the alienation between rich and
poor individuals.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 a simple
political economy model with cross-border shopping and limited and impure
altruism is developed to study how the size of jurisdictions affects both the
cost of redistribution and the political objectives of such policies. Section
3 analyses the relationship between the number of jurisdictions and global
welfare and section 4 offer some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
This paper analyses the relationship between number of jurisdictions and
the degree of redistribution in a model with two types of people; rich and
poor. There is only one factor of production, capital, and one final good.
The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale and one unit
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of capital produces one unit of the final good. There is perfect competition
in the final goods markets and the return to capital is equal to the producer
price of the final good which is normalized to unity. Rich people are endowed
with one unit of capital and the return to capital is their only source of
income. Their pre-tax income is therefore equal to unity. Poor people have no
income, but receives an in-kind transfer from the government. This transfer
is financed by a unit tax on all final goods sold within its territory. Differences
in tax rates therefore creates incentives for cross-border shopping.' However,
cross-border shopping is limited by transportation costs and we assume that
these costs are increasing in the distance from the border.
Individuals are assumed to be uniformly distributed along the circumfer-
ence of a circle and each person occupies one unit of space. There are R
capital owners and P poor people in the world and the length of the cir-
cumference is therefore given by N = R + P. The world is divided into n
equally sized jurisdictions that can be thought of as countries. The size of
each country, or equivalently the number of people in each country, is ac-
cordingly NIn. We assume that rich and poor people are evenly distributed
between jurisdictions so there are Rln rich people and Pin poor people in
each jurisdiction. This assumption ignores one of the most important prob-
lems of international redistribution, namely that poor people and rich people
tend to live in different parts of the world. Another important simplification
is that we assume that people cannot change residence, e.g. move closer to
the border or to another country.
2.1 Limited and impure altruism
All individuals are assumed to be limited altruists in the sense that they
care about the welfare of some, but not all, other individuals. Furthermore,
individuals are assumed to care about those people that are 'closest' to them
in some relevant sense. In this paper we attempt to capture this feature by
assuming that all individuals care about the a number of people that are
closest to them geographically. We can illustrate this by looking at a person
living at a point o on the circumference
4 Cross-border shopping could in this model be seen as a way to represent the more
general problem of tax competition.
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This person cares about the (J /2 people closest to her on each side. As-
suming that rich and poor people are evenly distributed within any segment
on the circumference, a person will care about (J ~ rich individuals and (J ~
poor individuals. If a person lives close to the border some of those she cares
about will be foreigners. We observe that a person who does not care about
any foreigners will care about a fraction (J;:' of the people in the country and
that this fraction is decreasing in the size of the country.
We also assume that people are impure altruists in the sense that they
only derive utility from the welfare of those they care about if they contribute
to their welfare. li a person is rich she contributes to the welfare of poor
persons by financing the transfers the poor receives and she gets a warm
glow feeling when these transfers go to poor people she cares about. li a
person is poor, her net contribution will be negative, and she will care about
the fact that people she care about are taxed in order to finance her transfers.
To represent impure altruism we assume that the weight a person of one type
gives to the welfare of persons of the other type is proportional to the share of
her net contribution to the tax system that goes to people she cares about.f
The welfare of a rich person will depend on where she buy's here final
goods and it is therefore necessary to distinguish between the utility of people
buying final goods in their home country and those who engage in cross-
border shopping. We start by characterizing the utility of a rich person k
who buys her goods, and pays her taxes, in the country i where she is a
citizen. For analytical convenience we assume her utility function is given by
(1)
where the subscript denotes the type of person and her country of res-
idence. The first element on the right hand side, V(c~i)' is the utility the
5People also care about some individuals of the same type. However, since people are
impure altruists they do not derive any utility from the welfare of those they do not help.
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person gets from private consumption, C~i. We assume that v' > O and
v" < O. Since the income of a rich person is equal to unity and the price of
the final good in country i is equal to (1+ ti)' we know that C~i = l~ti. The
second element on the right hand side is the utility the person derives from
the welfare of the poor. The utility a poor person in country i gets from
private consumption is given by V(CPi), where CPi is the private consumption
of a poor person in that country and is equal to the government transfer,
i.e. CPi =~. The expression a~i(n) can be interpreted as the weight placed
on the welfare of the poor and it captures the idea of limited and impure
altruism. It is given by
(2)
The constant /-t is a measure of altruism and we assume that /-t ~ 1. To
capture the idea that people only derive utility from helping people they care
about, this measure is multiplied with the share of her tax money that goes to
k
people she cares about. This share is given by ;7~,where O"~i is the number
of poor people in country i that a rich person k cares about and helps, and
Pin is the number of people that receive transfers in the jurisdiction. The
number O"~i will be equal to O" ~ unless the person lives close to the border
and will be equal to ~ ~ for persons living at the border. For O"~i = O" ~
we have that the weight given to the welfare of the poor can be written as
a(n) = /-to";~~ = ua ~. We observe that a(n) is a decreasing function of the
size of countries, or equivalently, an increasing function of n.
The utility of a rich person k, living in country i and buying her goods
in the closest jurisdiction j, is given by
(3)
This utility function differs from (1) in two ways. First, the person spends
some of her pre-tax income on transportation costs. The transportation cost
for a person located at a distance dk from the closest border is given by cdk
where c can be interpreted as the unit transportation cost. Since all countries
are identical we assume that the unit tax and the transfer to the poor is the
same in all foreign countries and they are denoted by t and T. The price of
the final good in country j is therefore (1 + t) and private consumption is
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accordingly given by C~i = (1 - cdk)/(1 + t). Since the rich person in this
case only pays taxes in country j, her tax payments will only benefit poor
people in that jurisdiction. The utility she derives from helping others will
therefore depend on the share of poor people she cares about in country j
and their welfare, given by v(cPj). Where the private consumption of the
poor in country j is given by CPj = T. The weight she gives the welfare of
the poor in country i. is therefore given by
(4)
where O"~j is the number of poor people in jurisdiction j that person k
cares about. This number is equal to zero if the person lives far from the
border (i.e. when dk > ~) and is equal to ~~ if she lives at the border.
The utility of a poor person k living in country i is given by
(5)
where the utility that the poor person derives from private consumption
is V(CPi) where CPi = T;.. The welfare of rich people only enters into the
utility function of a poor person if she cares about them and they pay taxes
in country i. The welfare of the rich is given by v(CRi) where CRi = l~ti' The
weight given to the welfare of the rich by a poor person k is given by
(6)
where O"~i is the number of rich persons that the poor person k cares
about and pay taxes in country i and R/n is the number of rich in country
i. If a poor person only cares about people living in the jurisdiction where
she lives and all those she cares about buy their goods in country i, the
weight given to the welfare of the rich is given by number will be equal to
0:(n) = ua ~)~ = ua ~. We observe that this weight is equal to the weight
given to the welfare of the poor by rich people who does not engage in cross-
border shopping and only cares about poor people in their own country.
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2.2 Cross-border shopping and tax competition
The only source of revenue for the government is a unit tax on final goods
bought within its jurisdiction. To simplify, we assume that the transfer
to the poor is given in kind and that only rich people buy goods and pay
taxes. Inter-jurisdictional differences in taxes give rich people in the high tax
country an incentive to buy their goods in the low-tax country. However,
cross-border shopping is costly and the cost is increasing with the distance
to the closest border. As noted above we assume that the transportation
cost is a linear function of the distance to the closest border.
A rich individual in country i chooses where to buy her goods so as to
maximizes her utility. The number of rich people, ~, buying their goods in
country i is given by observing that a rich person k located at the distance
di from the closest jurisdiction, i, is indifferent between shopping at home or
abroad when
1 I-cd-
v(-l-) + a~i(n)v(1i) = v( t) + a~/n)v(T) (7)
+ti l+t
This expression gives us di as a function the tax rate in foreign jurisdic-
tions and the tax rate in country i, i.e. di = d(t, ti), where ~ :::;O and
~ ~ O. Furthermore, we know that di = Owhen t = ti' For di > O, the rich
people in country i who live within di of the closest border will buy goods in
neighboring countries, and for di < Othe rich people in other countries who
live within (-di) of country i will buy their goods in country i. Since every
jurisdiction have two borders, and using the fact that all jurisdictions are
symmetrical, we have that the number of rich people who buy their goods in
country i is given by
(8)
where R/n is the number of rich people in each country and 2di ~ is the
number of rich people living within the distance di of the closest border. We
can illustrate the cross-border trade by the following two figures. If ti > t we
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----e----------------------e----
and if ti < t
-- - - - e- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -e - - - - -
where eindicates the borders between country i and the two adjacent
states. The tax base of a country i, Xi, is equal to R;, when some of its
residents buy their final goods abroad. However, when the foreigners buy
their goods in country i, R; =1= Xi. This is because people who buy their
goods in another country spend some of their income on transportation cost.
The average transportation cost for foreigners buying goods in country i is
equal to ~. We therefore have that country i's tax base is given by
E - 2d(t t·)R if ti > tn ' t N
Xi= E if ti = tn
E - 2d(t t.)R(l-~) if ti < tn ' t N 2
(9)
The tax base is in other words a function, X; = X(t, ti)' of the unit tax
in foreign jurisdictions and the unit tax in country i. When all countries
have the same unit tax, the tax base of each country is equal to R/n. The
elasticity of the tax base in country i is given by €i(n) = -...::l..xt.. a:_i and we
• •observe that €~(n) > O, i.e. the elasticity of the tax base is an increasing
function of the number of countries or equivalently a decreasing function of
the size of jurisdictions. The reason is simply that in small countries a larger
share of the population will live close to a border.
Each jurisdiction have an incentive to lower its tax in order to attract some
of the consumers from the neighboring jurisdictions. This tax competition
creates a positive tax externality in the sense that an increase in the tax rate
in one country increases the tax revenue in other countries. It is a well-known
result from the international tax literature that such tax competition might
result in less redistribution and underprovision of public goods compared
with the cooperative solution.
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2.3 The government's optimization problem
Since each country determines its tax policy through majority voting, the
government 's objectives will be determined by who the median voter is and
the weight the median voter attaches to the welfare of the minority. If the
number of rich people is higher than the number of poor people, any transfer
to the poor must be a result of some kind of benevolence on the part of
the rich. Similarly, if there is a majority of poor people, then the degree
of redistribution will be restrained by their concern for the rich minority.
To describe the government's optimization problem, we need to distinguish
between the situation where the poor have a majority and the situation where
the median voter is rich.
When R > P, the median voter will be a rich person since rich persons
always prefer a lower tax level than poor persons.f Since the preferences
of rich people depend on who they care about and whether they buy their
goods at home or not, we need to identify the group of rich that will be
the median voter. We assume that the group of rich people who prefer the
highest level of transfers will be the median voter, since this group will get
the support of the poor voters." We know that people who live close to the
border and care about poor people in neighboring countries, will prefer lower
taxes than those who only care about poor people in country i. Furthermore,
rich people who buy their goods in another country can only be better off by
a reduction in the tax level in the country where they live. The rich people
who do not engage in cross-border shopping and who only care about poor
people in the country where they live, is therefore the group of rich people
that prefer the highest tax and transfer leveL In this situation the median
voter's preferences, and the government's objective function in country i, is
thus given by
(10)
where a( n) = f.-L(J ~, is that weight given to the welfare of the poor by
the median voter. This weight will be the same in all jurisdictions. We also
observe that ei (n) = f.-L fv > 0, i.e. that the weight is increasing in the number
6This follows from the assumption that J.L < 1.
7This follows from the fact that the weight these people put on the interests of the poor
is lower.
114
of jurisdictions. Furthermore, we have that CRi = 1/(1 + ti) and CPi = ~.
The government's revenue function in country i is given by
(11)
where ~~'~) is the total amount of the final good purchased in country i.
Country i chooses a unit tax, ti, on the final good and a lump-sum transfer
to the poor, Ti, so as to maximize the median voter's utility function subject
to the requirement that
t· J?_t_X(t t·) _ -T > Ol+ti ,t n t_ (12)
i.e. that government expenditures do not exceed government incomes. The
Lagrangian of this problem can be written as
(13)
The first order conditions of this problem can be written as
(14)
(15)
(16)
from (15) we get that Ai = a(n~;~Pi). Because all countries are identical
and are located symmetrically, we know that in equilibrium the unit tax will
be the same in all countries and that X; = R/n. Using this and substituting
into (14) gives
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v' (CRi) R
'( ) = a(n) p [1 - (1+ ti)c(n)]v Cpi (17)
where c(n) = - t.~~i is the elasticity of the tax base and is the same
for all countries in equilibrium. The expression on the left-hand side is the
ratio between the marginal utility of consumption of the rich and of the
marginal utility of consumption of the poor. This ration can be interpreted
as a measure of the degree of redistribution. Since v" < Owe know that this
measure is increasing in the tax rate. If the two groups have the same after
tax income the measure is equal to one, if the rich have the highest after
tax income the measure is less than one, and if the poor have the highest
after tax income the measure is above one. Without any redistribution the
measure is equal to zero, assuming that the marginal utility of consumption
goes to infinity when consumption goes to zero.
By studying the right hand side of (17) we observe that the degree of
redistribution is increasing in the weight given to the welfare of the minority,
a(n), and this weight is an increasing function of the share of their tax
money that goes to people they care about. We also see that the degree of
redistribution is decreasing in the elasticity of the tax base c(n) because a
higher elasticity increases the cost of redistribution. Furthermore, we observe
that redistribution is increasing in RI P, because a higher share of rich people
reduces the tax cost of financing a given level of transfer to the poor. From
(17) we can derive the optimal unit tax when the rich are in majority, tRo In
general this tax will be a function, tR = tR(a(n), c(n)), of the weight given
to minority interests, a(n), and the elasticity of the tax base, c(n). The
equilibrium tax rate will therefore be higher the more the rich majority care
about the minority of poor and lower the more elastic the tax base is.
When P > R the median voter is a poor individual. We assume that
the group of poor people who prefer the lowest level of transfers will be the
median voter, since they get the support of the rich voters. The poor people
who only care about rich people that live in country i and do not engage
in cross-border shopping, will place most weight on the welfare of the rich.
This group is therefore the group of poor persons that will prefer the lowest
transfers. The median voter preferences, and the government's objective
function in country i, is then given by
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(18)
where the weight given to minority interests, a(n), as well as Cpi and CRi,
are the same as when the rich was in majority. The government is faced with
the budget restriction given by (12) and the Lagrangian for the governments
optimization problem is therefore given by
(19)
The first order conditions of the government optimization problem are
given by
(20)
(21)
et; ti P
- =--Xi--~=O
aAi 1+ ti n
from (21) we get that Ai = Vl;'/~i). Using symmetry of the equilibrium
solution, we can substitute into (20) and get
(22)
v' (CRi) R [1 - (1+ ti)c(n)]
V'(CPi) = p a(n) (23)
from (23) we can derive the optimal tax rate when the poor are in ma-
jority, t;, as a function of the weight given to minority interests, a(n), and
the elasticity of the tax base, c(n), i.e. t; = tp(a(n),c(n)). We observe that
the degree of redistribution also in this case is decreasing in the elasticity of
the tax base. This is what we would expect, since a more elastic tax base
makes redistribution more costly. However, while the degree of redistribution
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was increasing in the weight put on minority interests when the rich were in
majority, it is now a decreasing function of this weight. This reflects the fact
that the exploitation of the rich minority is checked partly by the possibility
of cross-border shopping, but also by the concern the majority feels for the
welfare of the minority group. As in the case where the R > P, we observe
that redistribution is increasing in RI P because it reduces the tax cost of
financing transfers. If a(n) is sufficiently small compared to c(n) we could in
this case get a solution where the poor have a higher after tax income than
the rich, i.e. that ~:~~~:~> 1. Clearly, this solution presupposes that the rich
cannot pretend to be poor. If this were not the case, the maximum level of
redistribution would be given by V'(CRi) = V'(CPi).
3 The Optimal Number of Jurisdictions
We are interested in studying how the degree of redistribution and global
welfare are affected by the size, or equivalently the number, of jurisdictions.
In order to do this, we ask what number of jurisdictions would be optimal
from the perspective of an utilitarian global planner. The global planner
should primarily be seen as a device that introduces a moral perspective
and not as an actual entity. However, if we think of jurisdictions as states
within a federation, or counties within a nation-state, we could view the
global planner as a constitutional assembly with the power to determine the
number of states or counties.
We assume that redistribution has to take place within sovereign juris-
dictions and that the only policy instrument the global planner has to her
disposal is the delimitation of fiscal jurisdiction. The global planner can in
other words determine the number of jurisdictions, n, but has to leave the
determination of the tax policy to the discretion of the majority in each
country.f There are two reasons why the decentralized choice of tax policy
SIt should be noted that this paper analyses political rather than economic integration.
Economic integration typically involves increased inter-jurisdictional mobility of factors
and commodities. In this model economic integration could be interpreted as a reduction
in c, the transportation cost. It is easy to see that economic integration might not be
an improvement from the point of view of the utilitarian global planner since it increases
the positive tax externalities between jurisdictions. If the rich are in majority we would
want to set c prohibitively high since this would transform the unit tax on capital into a
lump-sum tax. However, if the poor people have the majority, we might want a lower c in
order to prevent the poor from exploiting the rich minority.
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might differ from the tax policy that would maximize global welfare. First,
the objective function of the government in each country is not given by an
utilitarian welfare function, but by the preferences of the median voter. Sec-
ondly, when there is more than one country there will be tax externalities
between the jurisdictions. These externalities would be internalized by the
global planner.
We assume that the global planner is concerned with global welfare in
the sense that she wants to maximize the sum of utility in the world. The
objective function of the global planner is therefore given by
W = RV(CR) + PV(Cp) (24)
where CR = l~t' is the consumption level of the rich. From the govern-
ments' budget restriction (12) we have that the consumption level of the poor
is given by Cp = T* = l:·S(~)~.If the global planner could determine the
tax policy in each jurisdiction, she would set the unit tax so as to equalize
the consumption level of the rich and the poor, i.e. CR = Cp. This first best
solution is achieved when the unit tax is equal to t* = ~ and the transfer
is equal to T* = ~. However, we have assumed that the global planner is
restricted to choose n. We have seen that the solution to the median voter
optimization problem gives the optimal unit tax under the two regimes as
a function of the weight put on the welfare of minorities and of the elastic-
ity of the tax base. Both of these variables are functions of the number of
countries, n. The equilibrium unit tax, t*(n), is given by
t*(n) = tR(a(n), c(n)) if R> P
tp(a(n), c{n)) if R < P (25)
where we know that a'(n) > Oand that c'(n) > O. Furthermore we have
th t ~ O...£!£_ O ~ O d ~ O Th ti t' bla iJa(n) > 'iJa(n) < 'iJe(n) < an iJe(n) <. e op imiza Ion pro em
of the global planner is therefore to choose n so as to maximize
W R ( 1 ) P ( t*(n) R)
= v 1+ t* (n) + v 1+ t* (n) P (26)
The first order condition of this problem looks like this
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_8W_= -R dt* v,(_l_) + R dt* v'( t*(n) R) < o
an (1+ t*)2 dn 1+ t: (1+ t*)2 dn 1+ t*(n) P - (27)
where ~~ will depend on whether the rich or the poor are in majority.
From (27) we can in principle derive the optimal number of countries, n*
that maximize global welfare. Ideally the global planner wants to set n such
that t* (n) = ~. However, there might not be any n for which the first best
solution is achieved. The optimal n will then be a corner solution.
The optimal number of jurisdictions will depend on whether the capital
owners or the poor are in majority. When P > R, an increase in the size
of countries will increase the degree of redistribution both because it makes
it more difficult for the capital owners to escape taxation and because it
increases the tendency of the majority to neglect the interests of the capital
owners. We observe that for n = 1 the poor will have a higher after-tax
income than the rich because the unit tax effectively is a lump-sum tax. The
global planner might therefore want to set n > 1 in order to restrain the
exploitation of the capital owner. This result echoes that of Buchanan and
Brennan (1980) who argue that inter-regional tax externalities, due to tax
competition, are beneficial since they make taxation more costlyand thus
impose restrictions on the tax authority. However, the global planner will
not set n so high that V:((CRi~ < L
v CPi(
When R > P the median voter is a rich person. In this situation an
increase in the size of jurisdictions has two counteracting effects. First, it
reduces the cost of redistribution by reducing the international tax external-
ities associated with cross-border shopping. However, an increase in the size
of jurisdictions will also reduce the weight given to minority interests by the
median voter. Since the unit tax in this situation always will be lower than,
or equal to, the first best optimum, the global planner simply chooses the
number of jurisdictions that maximizes tR(a(n), c(n)).
The debate about unification and enlargement of political units has fo-
cused on the problem of tax competition and the economic literature has
shown that countries might gain from unification since tax externalities might
be eliminated. However, the analysis presented above has shown that an in-
crease in the size of jurisdictions also might reduce the motivation to take
the welfare of minorities into account and undermine the solidarity that is
essential for the support of the welfare state. There might therefore be sit-
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uations where an enlargement of political units might reduce the degree of
redistribution.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper has shown that a territorial delimitation of fiscal jurisdiction, and
decentralization of tax policy, might be justified even when the sole purpose
of fiscal policy is to redistribute between rich and poor and when the cost of
redistribution is increasing in the number of jurisdictions. The basis for this
result has been the assumption that people are limited and impure altruists
and that the size of jurisdictions therefore affects the motivation to take
account of minority interests.
David Hume (1777, 145-146) is well know for his claim that questions of
distributive justice only arise under conditions of moderate scarcity. How-
ever, Hume also argued that limited benevolence is part of the circumstances
of justice and this paper illustrates the importance of this factor in evaluating
the delimitation of fiscal jurisdictions. The relationship between minority in-
terests and country size established in this paper can also be seen as a contri-
bution to an important discussion in contemporary normative theory. Many
writers on international justice have been concerned with the apparent ten-
sion between cosmopolitan moral theories and the existence of nation-states
with responsibility for redistribution within their territory. This paper re-
duces this tension by showing how a delimitation of jurisdictions can be
justified even within cosmopolitan moral theories. From the point of view of
the global planner, state borders can be seen as convenient ways of allocat-
ing responsibilities that themselves derive from universal principles like the
utilitarian principle. Robert Goodin (1995, p. 282) makes the same point
when he argues that" a great many general duties point to tasks that, for one
reason or another, are pursued more effectively if they are subdivided and
particular people are assigned special responsibility for particular portions
of the task". Often this has to do with the advantage of specialization and
division of labour (Shue 1988). At other times, it has to do with lumpiness in
the information required to do a good job, and the limits on people's capacity
for processing requisite quantities of information about a great many cases
at once. This paper has focused on the nature of altruism and shown that it
makes sense from a utilitarian point of view to let people who care about each
other's welfare be responsible for each other's welfare. This might seem like
121
an obvious point, but it is often neglected in discussions about enlargement
and separation of jurisdictions.
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